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1. INTRODUCTION
The fifteen-year struggle over Hong Kong's future has been a
struggle over the rule of law. The People's Republic of China
("P.R.C.") and Great Britain agreed at the outset of negotiations
over the territory's future to strive to preserve Hong Kong's "sta-
bility and prosperity," a task that was seen to depend on preserv-
ing the rule of law. Specifically, this meant pledging to maintain
the territory's common law legal system and most of its existing
laws while also undertaking to construct judicial, law-making, and
law-administering institutions adequate to implement a "high de-
gree of autonomy" for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
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gion ("S.A.R."). In addition, much of the work and many of the
conflicts in the preparations for Hong Kong's transition and the es-
tablishment of the S.A.R., from the drafting of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong' ("Joint Declaration")
and the Basic Law for the Hong Kong S.A.R.2 ("Basic Law"), to the
disputes over late colonial amendments to Hong Kong ordinances,
to the enactment of national and local legislation establishing
S.A.R. government organs, have centered on law and legal docu-
ments. For the British colonial authorities, the P.R.C., rising politi-
cal leaders in Hong Kong, and the residents of Hong Kong, much
of the discourse over what seem clearly to be political, economic,
and social issues has focused on questions about laws, law-making
and law-interpreting institutions, and the rule of law.
This "legal" focus has remained as Hong Kong's protracted
transition has entered its "endgame." 3 In the final years and
months leading up to the formal handback of Hong Kong, the fo-
cus, however, has turned increasingly to two seemingly disparate
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(1997).
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article is
the first of a two-part series. The second part will appear as Hong Kong's End-
game and the Rule of Law (II): The Battle Over "the People" and the Business
Community in the Transition to Chinese Rule in volume 18, number 3 of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School Journal of International Economic Law. The
authors thank Richard Sik-Wing Au, Jennifer Shiu-Li Fan, and Beatrice Mohini
Schaffrath for their timely and indispensable research assistance, and Rosi Blake
and the staff of the Journal for excellent and extraordinarily patient editorial
work. Support for this Article, and the broader project of which it is a part, was
provided by the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation.
McKinsey & Company, Beijing, China. Formerly Assistant Professor of
Government, Franklin & Marshall College.
1 See Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-
P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
2 See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990 (P.R.C.), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520 [here-
inafter Basic Law].
3 The term "endgame" has taken on two quite different meanings, both of
which shed light on the battle over laws and institutions in contemporary Hong
Kong in ways that this Article and its sequel explain. In the rational choice and
game theory literature, "endgame" refers to the last round of a reiterative game,
when the (intra-game) reputational incentives to cooperate fall away, increasing
the likelihood of "defection" or "cheating," and, therefore, the difficulty of mak-
ing any bargains (or at least any credible bargains). In a more colloquial sense, the
"endgame" refers to a final "push" in which participants scramble to strike bar-
gains against an impending deadline, with the result often being an eleventh-hour
"breakthrough" or a flurry of small deals.
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yet closely related issues. First, the impending deadline for the ter-
ritory's reversion to Chinese rule has forced all participants in the
politics of Hong Kong's transition to address specific laws and in-
stitutions for the S.A.R., which will be the nuts and bolts of a func-
tioning legal system, government, and constitutional order for
Hong Kong beyond July 1, 1997. In particular, conflicts over a Bill
of Rights Ordinance, a Court of Final Appeal ("C.F.A.") bill, the
status of the Legislative Council ("Legco") and a successor Provi-
sional Legislature, and the process for selecting the S.A.R.'s first
Chief Executive, have been central controversies in transitional
Hong Kong's endgame. Second, the approach of the reversion date
has generated an intense political competition over what notions of
law and legality will prevail among groups that seem essential to
Hong Kong's continued prosperity and stability. Here, the sharp-
est and most sustained conflicts have concerned the rule-of-law
values and related attitudes toward concrete legal and institutional
controversies that "the Hong Kong people" and the territory's
business elite do in fact hold or could be persuaded to adopt.
These questions of tangible institutions and diffuse values have
been the objects of a struggle between two coherent, although not
monolithic, camps that have adhered to competing visions of sov-
ereignty and law with respect to Hong Kong. On one side, the
P.R.C., together with its Hong Kong allies and surrogates, have
approached such issues primarily from a positivist perspective,
with proceduralist standards of legitimacy for laws and vast sub-
stantive discretion for the sovereign at the core of their conception
of "domestic law" for Hong Kong. On the other side, a more
loosely defined group of "liberals" or "democrats" among Hong
Kong's emergent politicians and its British colonial rulers have
been animated by a broadly natural law-influenced view of Hong
Kong's domestic legal order. This view accords a central place to
the notion that laws and the organs that make and apply the law
must comport with specific, substantive standards of what justice
demands of a sovereign.
In some respects, this fundamental clash of visions would ap-
pear to leave little room for the complex and subtle struggles over
rule-of-law values and institutional detail that have been unfolding
in contemporary Hong Kong. As the debates centering on the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law during the 1980s and many of the
political conflicts of the 1990s have shown, the main protagonists
in the drama of shaping Hong Kong's future judge the validity of
the legal and institutional arrangements for the S.A.R. according to
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incommensurable and incompatible standards that emphasize
broad and categorical claims about the character of legitimate au-
thority. Each side has seemed determined to assert the exclusive
validity of its preferred standard. This polarized conflict has con-
tinued to the eve of reversion. It has generated a series of confron-
tations in which members of the two political camps have made
clear their sharply different understandings of the key controver-
sies of the era and their divergent litmus tests for acceptable solu-
tions to them. In a battle thus fought in terms of what is non-
negotiably "right" or non-derogably committed to sovereign dis-
cretion, what position to take on particular proposed laws or insti-
tutions for the S.A.R. would appear to be a matter not open to am-
biguity or conducive to ambivalence, and the subjective attitudes
of particular Hong Kong communities would seem to be at best pe-
ripheral, if not entirely inadmissible, concerns. That has not, how-
ever, been the case during the final years of the struggle over the
S.A.R.'s legal and institutional order.
As the arrival of the endgame during the past several years
shifted the agenda to wrangling over concrete laws and law-
related institutions, and despite a sharpening of the basic ideologi-
cal clashes over the territory's post-1997 order, previously recessive
qualities of indeterminacy and flexibility also have come to the fore
in the visions of law and sovereignty of both sides. For the P.R.C.
side, these key questions of the era have been ones to which its
positivist perspective has offered no single answer. Within the
boundaries set by the minimal constraint that nothing be allowed
to compromise the P.R.C.'s ultimate sovereignty over Hong Kong,
there is a considerable variety of plausible answers to the question
of how much accommodation of liberal and legalist views is pru-
dent in the quest for specific legal rules and institutional arrange-
ments conducive to a smooth transition. Although newly visible,
such tactical flexibility is not new to (nor a departure from) the
perspective on law and sovereignty that the P.R.C. and its allies
have shared. One of the principal features of a radically positivist
conception of domestic law, after all, is the sovereign's discretion
to choose among a fairly wide range of laws and institutions.
On the "liberal" or "democratic" side, the central concerns of
the era also have been ones to which a generally naturalist perspec-
tive offers diverse and conflicting answers. Although the basic vi-
sion clearly precludes actions and arrangements incompatible with
the fundamental demands of justice, it does not prescribe legal or
institutional details to a high level of specificity. Rather, it leaves
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such matters to be shaped by local circumstance. A general notion
that sovereignty ought to be exercised through accountable gov-
ernment institutions that undergird a rule of law, for instance, nec-
essarily leaves much room for interpreting precisely what institu-
tional forms or legal norms are adequate and appropriate in a
particular setting. With questions about such "details" having
risen high on the agenda, this always-present "space" for different
readings of what fixed but abstract principles require simply be-
comes more relevant than it had been in earlier phases of the proc-
ess of shaping Hong Kong's post-1997 future.
With the focus thus shifted to issues with respect to which ad-
herents of either relevant conception of sovereignty and domestic
law might disagree among themselves or change their positions
over time, the connection to the endgame's second shift of focus
becomes clearer. In such a context of flexibility and indeterminacy,
the rule-of-law values held by major social groups can matter a
great deal. For adherents to a basically "positivist" perspective,
they can affect the sovereign's policy preferences and prudential
calculations. For proponents of a broadly "naturalist" vision, they
may constitute key components of the local circumstances that can
shade interpretations of the demands of justice. The ideas that key
Hong Kong communities hold thus emerge as factors that will
greatly determine where - and perhaps whether - a politically and
economically viable set of concrete legal and institutional arrange-
ments for the S.A.R. will fall within the range of options that mem-
bers of either side in the political clash of visions could find accept-
able in principle.
Moreover, the sustainability of any package of legal and insti-
tutional arrangements that is acceptable to the P.R.C. and its sup-
porters, or the necessity of any package advanced by their coun-
terparts among the territory's emergent politicians and colonial
rulers, seems to depend on the support, or at least acquiescence, of
key groups in the territory after 1997. Put simply, an answer to the
central questions of the endgame that failed to win acceptance
among the ordinary citizenry of Hong Kong, "the Hong Kong peo-
ple," could jeopardize the territory's political stability, which is it-
self a precondition to prosperity. An answer to those legal and in-
stitutional questions that failed to comport with the views and
values of the territory's business community would be hazardous
for Hong Kong's prosperity, which is a linchpin of the territory's
political stability. An answer that offered something that neither
group wanted or needed would be especially likely to fail.
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Accordingly, during the last several years of Hong Kong's tran-
sition, participants in the ongoing political struggle over the terri-
tory's future order worked to claim and to create support among
"the people" and business elites in Hong Kong for rule-of-law atti-
tudes that they found relatively appealing, or that were at least
minimally acceptable under their broad visions of law and sover-
eignty. Section 2 of this Article considers those "visions." It
sketches the fundamentally conflicting conceptions of the nature
and basis of domestic law for the Hong Kong S.A.R. that the prin-
cipal parties to the political struggle over Hong Kong's post-1997
order have held throughout the process of negotiating the terms of
Hong Kong's reversion. Section 3 examines in more detail how the
clash of basic perspectives has unfolded in the struggles over the
specific legal and institutional issues that have dominated the
agenda in the years after the adoption of the Basic Law. It explains
how the positions that key participants staked out on such issues
as the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the legislature, the Court of Final
Appeal, and the chief executive selection methods fit within either
of the two opposed visions, one shared by the P.R.C. and its sup-
porters in Hong Kong and another by their frequent antagonists of
a generally liberal or democratic bent.
Section 4 then turns to an assessment of the other side of the
apparent paradox of the era. It points to the exposure of significant
room for choice and disagreement over specific legal and institu-
tional prescriptions within the confines of either overarching vi-
sion. Section 4 then explains how the rising salience of issues that
revealed or permitted such flexibility combined with changes in
Hong Kong politics to produce a greater concern with the rule-of-
law-related values and attitudes held by vital segments of Hong
Kong society. Section 4 then briefly summarizes the strategies that
the parties to the political struggles over the shape of S.A.R. laws
and institutions deployed in their efforts to elicit and enlist support
from the ordinary citizenry and business elites in Hong Kong. (A
more detailed analysis of the political battles over the attitudes of
"the people" and "the business community" toward the rule of law
and the specific legal and institutional issues of the 1990s is under-
taken in a separate article which will appear in a subsequent issue
of this Journal.)
Section 5 of this Article suggests how different concepts of an
"endgame" might help to explain the seemingly odd coexistence of
the appeals to principle and interest in the battles over the alle-
giance of social groups, the emergence of clearer splits and shifts in
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specific legal and institutional prescriptions advocated by adher-
ents to either vision of law and sovereignty, and the persistence-
even escalation-of the clash between visions. Section 5 also sug-
gests how those battles, splits and shifts may manifest "endgame
strategies," in some rather different senses of that term, pursued by
adherents to the two visions of sovereignty and domestic law that
are, at once, polar opposites and capacious enough to permit the
finding of some common ground on some concrete issues.
2. TwO VISIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND DOMESTIC LAW FOR HONG
KONG
In some respects, there has been a remarkable consensus about
the legal and related institutional order for a Chinese-ruled Hong
Kong. All participants in the protracted process of shaping Hong
Kong's future appear to have accepted the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law as the documents that set the fundamental framework de-
fining that order, with the Basic Law implementing and making spe-
cific the general undertakings set forth in the Joint Declaration. All
sides also appear to have agreed that establishing the legal underpin-
nings for the S.A.R. legislature and its top court, and selecting its first
chief executive, constituted much of the essential work of the termi-
nal colonial phase. There also seems to have been general recogni-
tion that the Bill of Rights question and related issues of the reception
of colonial law into S.A.R. law were among the other major items at
the top of that agenda. More diffusely, the various participants all
saw settlement of such issues as essential to guaranteeing Hong
Kong a "rule of law" that would help sustain stability and prosperity.
Still, the two principal groups that were engaged in the politi-
cal process of addressing these questions divided profoundly on
how they should be answered. This division created an ongoing
conflict that in some respects has sharpened during the endgame,
and that has been, throughout the transitional period, rooted in a
clash between radically different notions of what makes any par-
ticular legal and institutional arrangement for the S.A.R. either po-
tentially legitimate or unacceptable even in principle.
2.1. The P.R.C. and "Pro-P.R.C." Vision: Sovereign Discretion and
Procedural Legitimacy
In addressing the S.A.R.'s internal legal and institutional order,
the P.R.C. has consistently taken the position that the rules for how
Hong Kong's post-1997 laws will be made -as well as some of the
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laws themselves and the authority of the institutions that make, in-
terpret, and apply those laws -are matters for the P.R.C. alone to
determine, through proper exercises of its sovereign legislative
power. In making laws, establishing and defining legal and politi-
cal institutions, and determining the permissible modes of exercis-
ing legal and political authority in Hong Kong, the P.R.C. enjoys
the plenary authority of the positivist sovereign fully empowered
to act within its domestic realm.
The P.R.C. is free to decide specific content of Hong Kong laws,
including what rights of citizens they will offer and protect, how
nearly they will approach socialist ideals, how much they will look
like legislation in effect elsewhere in the People's Republic, and
how far they will depart from the laws on the books in Hong Kong
at the end of the era of British rule. The P.R.C. may make these de-
cisions without regard to what the residents of Hong Kong or the
British (or anyone else) claim to be the demands of substantive jus-
tice, human rights, the requisites of good government, or even the
traditions or established practices of Hong Kong's economy and
society. The same latitude for choice surrounds the decisions
about how autonomous the S.A.R. should be, what powers its leg-
islature, chief executive, and courts shall enjoy, and the procedures
through which such organs may act and by which their office-
holders are to be selected. 4
Thus, any number of legal and institutional arrangements
could be adopted via the Basic Law or other domestic Chinese leg-
islation assigning the exercise of legal and governmental authority
in the Hong Kong S.A.R. No principle forbids or requires the Basic
Law or other domestic Chinese statutes to delegate substantial
law-making, administrative, or adjudicative authority to the S.A.R.
4 One of the most formal indications of this position is China's careful casting
of its statements about the status of the arrangements it has accepted for Hong
Kong's future order in the Basic Law. A piece of domestic legislation of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China ("P.R.C."), the Basic Law declares that China "has de-
cided" Uueding] to establish the S.A.R., and that it is the P.R.C.'s National People's
Congress ("N.P.C.") that "authorizes" [shouquan] the S.A.R. to exercise autonomy
and enjoy various powers under the Basic Law. See id. pmbl., art. 2. At various
points during the transition, official Chinese sources have asserted that the Chi-
nese government alone, and not the colonial government, has the authority to
speak for the Hong Kong people. See, e.g., Philip Bowring & Emily Lau, Turning
Up the Heat, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 14, 1991, at 24. More generally, the Chinese
official position has long been that Hong Kong has always been subject to Chinese
sovereignty. This position is reflected in the statement in the Joint Declaration
that China "has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong."
See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 1.
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government or to mandate that Hong Kong's distinctive "systems"
remain unchanged. 5
More concretely, the Basic Law is to be the constitutive docu-
ment for the future Hong Kong S.A.R., the source of authority for
its legislative, executive, and judicial organs, and the touchstone of
validity for its specific laws. The Basic Law itself is a discretionary
and proper exercise of the P.R.C.'s sovereign legislative authority
by the P.R.C.'s National People's Congress ("N.P.C.") and thus
would be no less valid if it had substantially different content.
Hong Kong laws predating the establishment of the S.A.R. can be
valid after June 30, 1997, but only if they are either incorporated by
the provisions of the Basic Law, adopted pursuant to the Basic
Law's provisions conferring law-making authority, or enacted in
the same general manner as the Basic Law.6
As this brief statement of the Basic Law's status and function
suggests, the P.R.C.'s vision of domestic law for Hong Kong does
not demand discretion for the Chinese sovereign to be so com-
pletely unconstrained so as to preclude elements commonly
thought necessary for a distinctively legal or law-governed order.
Even within the P.R.C.'s rather radically positivist perspective, the
force of substantive laws and of organic laws for government insti-
tutions depends upon their having been duly enacted by institu-
tions with sufficient formal powers and according to proper legal
and constitutional procedures.
Such a proceduralist understanding of the domestic exercise of
sovereignty existed throughout the P.R.C.'s handling of questions
about Hong Kong's future legal and institutional arrangements
even before the Basic Law was drafted. Article 31 of the current
(1982) Chinese Constitution carefully creates the legal basis for es-
tablishing the S.A.R. 7 The actions adopting the Basic Law and im-
plementing legislation have been arranged to conform to require-
5 The Joint Declaration complicates this analysis somewhat. Under the
United Kingdom's ("U.K.") highly contractarian conception of the Joint Declara-
tion-as-treaty, China has undertaken a number of very constraining obligations
that limit whatever latitude it might otherwise have in legislating domestically for
the S.A.R. For China, under its expansive notion of non-derogable sovereignty at
international law, the constraining effect of such undertakings was much less
clear. In any event, whatever restrictions the Joint Declaration might impose on
domestic legislative discretion, they are, from either perspective, matters not of
principle but of the practice of bilateral negotiation or unilateral pronouncement.
See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6 See generally Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 1-11, 18.
7 See XIANFA [Constitution] art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.).
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ments of proper legislative or quasi-legislative process, and have
been cast as exercises of authority lawfully committed to the issu-
ing organs. Thus, the Basic Law itself was duly enacted by the
N.P.C., in accordance with the requirements for national legislation
set forth in the state constitution, and as an exercise of legislative
authority granted to the N.P.C. by that constitution. 8 The simulta-
neous decisions concerning the establishment of the initial S.A.R.
Legislature and selection of its first Chief Executive were also of-
fered by the N.P.C. as a proper exercise of its legislative authority
over a part of the P.R.C.9
Moreover, much of the text of the Basic Law itself is devoted to
defining the scope of authority and the operating procedures of
S.A.R. government institutions, and the relationship between the
S.A.R. government and the Central People's Government in Bei-
jing10 Such provisions, viewed from the P.R.C.'s perspective, are
specifications of the principle that local legislation, judicial inter-
pretations, and other legal rules in the S.A.R. must conform to the
processes and fall within the scope of delegated powers that the
P.R.C. has authorized in the Basic Law or in national legislation
applicable to Hong Kong.
Such minimal proceduralism, however, is still only one aspect
of the Chinese conception of the domestic legal enterprise in Hong
Kong. In the P.R.C.'s positivist vision, the preservation of the
P.R.C.'s substantive latitude in lawmaking remains a necessary ac-
companiment to the emphasis on procedural legitimacy. No allo-
cation of authority or substantive commitment in domestic law can
be permitted to have the effect of irretrievably alienating the Chi-
nese sovereign's discretionary authority in ruling Hong Kong. Put
broadly, the P.R.C. cannot undertake lightly any potentially run-
away promises of S.A.R. autonomy. Put more narrowly, because
one aim of proceduralist legitimacy is to assure and enhance the
sovereign's capacity to make laws that reflect its preferred policies,
the P.R.C. cannot countenance binding or irrevocable promises that
empower Hong Kong to enact laws or establish institutions that
8 See id. arts. 47, 58, 62; Basic Law, supra note 2, pmbl., art. 11 (citing article 31
of the Constitution).
9 See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xianggang Tebie Xingzheng Qu
Diyi Ju Zhengfu he Fahui Chansheng Banfa de Jueding [Decision of the National People's
Congress on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legisla-
tive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] (1990), reprinted in Basic
Law, supra note 2 [hereinafter N.P.C. Decision].
10 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 12-23, 43-104, 158-59.
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could undermine the P.R.C.'s Hong Kong policies which, as
"mere" policies, are potentially malleable.
Examples of the P.R.C.'s adherence to this principle of domestic
sovereignty in its approach to issues of S.A.R. laws and institutions
are legion. In crafting the S.A.R.'s legal order, the P.R.C. has been
careful to retain decisive authority in P.R.C. institutions and
P.R.C.-controlled processes. The P.R.C. constitutional provision on
special administrative regions preserves flexibility about when and
for how long such an entity is established and what its special
powers include." Under the Basic Law, which some call Hong
Kong's "mini-constitution," such vital functions as amending and
interpreting the Basic Law, directing judicial interpretation of some
of its most sensitive provisions, and appointing the execu-
tive-dominated S.A.R. government's Chief Executive, are ulti-
mately and formally left to the N.P.C., its Standing Committee, or
the Central People's Government.12 Because the Basic Law itself is
a P.R.C. statute enacted by the N.P.C., under Chinese constitu-
tional theory it is freely amendable by procedurally proper subse-
quent legislation. The clause in the Basic Law barring amendments
inconsistent with the P.R.C.'s "established basic policies ... regard-
ing Hong Kong" 13 is presumptively unable constitutionally to pre-
clude contrary subsequent legislative action. Paragraphs 1 and 3
and Annex I of the Joint Declaration, which set forth the key initial
statement of those policies, are themselves cast as unilateral Chi-
nese pronouncements, avoiding as much as possible the air of
binding international legal commitment.' 4
2.2. The British and Hong Kong Liberal-Democratic Vision: Sovereign
Obligation and Substantive Values
Hong Kong's colonial masters and its emergent group of liberal
and pro-democracy politicians have shared a perspective on do-
1 See XIANFA [Constitution] art. 31 (1982).
12 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 158, 159, and annex I.
13 See id. art. 159.
14 The Joint Declaration states that China "has decided to resume the exercise
of sovereignty over Hong Kong . J. " joint Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1 (em-
phasis added). Article 3 sets forth very general promises about Hong Kong's fu-
ture autonomy and order in text following a statement that the P.R.C. "declares
that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong are as
follows .... Id. art. 3 (emphasis added). A more detailed statement of those "ba-
sic policies" is consigned to Annex I, which is also cast as a unilateral
"elabor[ation of] the basic policies of the People's Republic of China . Id. an-
nex I.
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mestic law and government institutions for the S.A.R. that has been
profoundly at odds with that of the P.R.C. and its supporters in the
territory. The Basic Law, domestic Hong Kong legislation seeking
to survive the transition to Chinese rule,15 the powers and author-
ity of the law-making and law-applying institutions for the S.A.R.,
and post-1997 substantive laws for the S.A.R. are, on this view, to
be judged on the basis of their conformity to norms of what just
and good laws and government institutions must be.
To varying degrees and at various times, many of Hong Kong's
most prominent politicians (outside the distinctly pro-P.R.C. and
"business conservative" camps), the territory's governor, and offi-
cials in London have defined those norms in basically liberal, de-
mocratic, and legalist terms. This diverse group of participants in
the political struggles over Hong Kong's future have seen the
package of sovereign obligations as including at least the reliable
and neutral interpretation and enforcement of laws by a profes-
sional and independent judiciary and civil service. According to
the publicly expressed views of colonial officials and many Hong
Kong leaders, the package must also include the economic free-
doms and many of the civil and political liberties that Hong Kong
residents have enjoyed in practice during the closing years of Brit-
ish rule. In addition, something more is necessary in the way of
publicly accountable institutions that are at least broadly demo-
cratic in spirit.
The perspective underlying this position has many of the char-
acteristics of a natural law understanding of sovereignty's domes-
tic face. The standards against which the S.A.R.'s domestic laws
and institutions are to be measured are ultimately fixed and sub-
stantive. As the adherents to this view see it, these standards are
more than the transient or contingent values that the British au-
thorities or Hong Kong's new liberals and democrats happen to
hold dear and would like to foster; they are more permanent and
less malleable than mere political preference or social consensus.
Moreover, the proponents of this view have understood these
demands not primarily as reflecting the natural "rights" of Hong
Kong's citizens (although that argument has surfaced as well), but
rather as obligations that a sovereign owes to its subjects. Nothing
fundamental turns on the formal or procedural status of arrange-
ments that track or breach those obligations. Promises about Hong
15 See id. annex I, art. II; Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 160 (permitting the "laws
previously in force in Hong Kong" to be adopted as laws for the S.A.R.).
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Kong's laws and institutions that the P.R.C. has been willing to ac-
cept and embody in the S.A.R.'s foundational documents are seen
as part of an inseverable bundle of principles, including a number
of additional ones that the P.R.C. has been determined to reject.
Conversely, the fact that a provision inconsistent with a just and
good legal and institutional order has been enshrined in a statute
or other instrument applicable to the S.A.R. cannot save it from il-
legitimacy, and, by some lights, invalidity.
Indications of the British authorities' affinity for this perspec-
tive can be found in several aspects of their handling of questions
of domestic legal and institutional arrangements for the S.A.R. At
the beginning of the Sino-British negotiations on the territory's fu-
ture, Prime Minister Thatcher announced that Britain had a moral
obligation and duty to the people of Hong Kong. Such a duty at
least implicitly extended beyond the point at which Britain entered
into a treaty to hand Hong Kong to the P.R.C. and in some sense
beyond the end of British administration of the territory in 1997-
two watershed dates for the termination of legal duties with re-
spect to Hong Kong (first, that of presumptively permanent sover-
eign, and second, that of exerciser of sovereign power and pro-
vider of laws and governance).16
Moreover, Britain had backed the inclusion in the Joint Declara-
tion of a number of provisions protecting or promoting liberal, le-
galist, and democratic values under post-1997 Hong Kong law.
That was at least part of the import of passages pledging the con-
tinuation of Hong Kong's laws in force, as well as the common law,
judicial, social, and economic systems, the applicability of the prin-
cipal United Nations human rights covenants and a list of specific
liberal rights, and the constitution of future legislatures by elec-
tion.17 In addition, British authorities in London and in the colony
later pressed for a substantial voice and role in shaping the laws
and institutions for post-reversion Hong Kong, despite their formal
exclusion from the centerpiece of that process, the drafting of the
Basic Law. In addition to supporting a broadly liberal and democ-
ratic S.A.R. constitutional order, the British authorities began to
undertake compatible changes in areas that remained under their
control. They took modest steps toward democratizing the terri-
16 Governor Patten made the point explicitly, stating that "Britain's moral re-
sponsibility extends beyond June 30, 1997." The Long View, FARE. ECON. REV., May
30, 1996, at 17 (interview with Governor Patten).
17 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3), (5), annex I § I-II, XIII. The
Joint Declaration and its annexes are equally binding. See id. para. 8.
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tory's quasi-representative institutions, with such moves beginning
years before the endgame gambits of Governor Patten's electoral
reforms and the enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance.' 8
At the very least, such serious and varied efforts (as well as the
rhetoric of moral responsibility and duty) suggested a lack of ac-
ceptance of the P.R.C.'s positivist vision of domestic sovereignty.
If, as the Chinese view sometimes seemed to claim, Hong Kong's
local laws were worth little more than the paper they were printed
on, to be revoked, amended or overridden freely by a narrowly
self-interested or fickle Central People's Government or N.P.C.,
then there would have been little point to the British concerning
themselves with the substance of those laws at all.
For many of Hong Kong's emergent leaders and political activ-
ists, there was a still-stronger affection for a viewpoint that was
broadly naturalist in spirit and liberal, democratic, and legalist in
substance. To the extent that the draft Joint Declaration received a
genuinely favorable reaction in politically aware communities in
Hong Kong, its promises of continuity in Hong Kong's distinctive
legal, social, and economic systems-which to a significant degree
embodied strong rule of law and liberal, if not fully democratic,
values-were the reason.1 9 And some of the most serious doubts
harbored in the territory about the Basic Law, such as its reserving
to the P.R.C.'s N.P.C. and its Standing Committee the power to in-
terpret and amend the Basic Law and, in some circumstances, to
legislate for the S.A.R., seem to have been driven largely by the
fear that such provisions would hinder the continuation and
growth of a liberal order with strong rule-of-law norms.
20
Members of Hong Kong's emerging liberal and "pro-democra-
18 See generally James T.H. Tang & Frank Ching, The MacLehose-Youde Years:
Balancing the "Three-Legged Stool," 1971-86, in PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG KONG
BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1991 at 149, 160-64 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1994);
NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 25-28, 36-37 (5th
ed. 1995).
19 See Background to the Negotiations Preceding the Sino-British Joint Declaration,
reprinted in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 197, 200-02 (Hungdah Chiu et al. eds.,
1987); Report of the Assessment Office on Arrangements for Testing the Acceptability of
the Draft Agreement on the Future of the Territory, ch. 3, reprinted in THE FUTURE OF
HONG KONG 212; The Future of Hong Kong: Statement Issued by the Unofficial Mem-
bers of the Hong Kong Executive and Legislative Councils on Nov. 29, 1984, reprinted in
THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 220. See also IAN SCOTr, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE
CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN HONG KONG 212-13 (1989).
20 See, e.g., Denis Chang, In Search of Pragmatic Solutions, in THE BASIC LAW
AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 271 (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert H.Y. Chen eds.,
1988).
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cy" political circles were adamant that Hong Kong's future laws
and institution were to be judged by their conformity to standards
that no government was at liberty to define or redefine. In com-
parison to the views expressed by British officials, these Hong
Kong voices were more openly skeptical and worried that the
properly enacted laws and duly established institutions of the fu-
ture P.R.C.-run S.A.R. would fail to meet the relevant standards of
justice.2
1
Even before the return to Chinese rule came to dominate Hong
Kong politics, the same general perspective had pervaded local
criticisms that some of Hong Kong's long-standing colonial laws
were unjust, regardless of their positivist validity. Most visible in
this area were, first, criticisms of laws that restricted public meet-
ings and political organizations, permitted film censorship, chilled
press freedom, and allowed corporal and capital punishment, and,
second, a critique of Britain's failure to take steps to develop de-
mocratic government for the colony.22
Also well in advance of Hong Kong's reversion, the territory's
legal community, which was the source of so many of Hong
Kong's liberal and pro-democracy politicians, had developed a
powerful belief that the rule of law is one of the most definitive
qualities of Hong Kong's system, and that its cultivation and pres-
ervation are the ultimate explanation and guarantee of Hong
Kong's past and future success.23 The perceived connection has
been repeated so often and for so long that it has become a kind of
talisman not just for lawyers but also for public servants, and for
substantial segments of the territory's citizenry. The rule of law
that is seen as having such power and such potential, and as being
so gravely at risk even if the P.R.C. honors many of its promises, is
something profoundly different from the sparsely procedural and
substantively malleable one envisioned by a P.R.C.-style positivist
approach to domestic law for the Hong Kong S.A.R.
21 See, e.g., Martin C.M. Lee, A Tale of Two Articles, in THE BASIc LAW AND
HONG KONG'S FUTURE, supra note 20, at 309; Ming K. Chan, Democracy Derailed:
Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90, in THE HONG KONG
BASIc LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY AND PROSPERITY" UNDER CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY? 3 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991).
22 See, e.g., Li Tuet-wah, Freedom of the Media, in FROM COLONY TO S.A.R.:
HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 457 Uoseph Y.S. Cheng & Sonny S.H. Lo eds.,
1995).
23 See, e.g., Martin C.M. Lee, Need for "Rule of Law", S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 1, 1993, at 11.
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3. Conflicting Visions and the Legal and Institutional Issues of the
Endgame
The clash of fundamentally conflicting conceptions of domestic
sovereignty has continued, and indeed sharpened, as the endgame
has arrived, and the process of defining the territory's future order
has moved beyond the broad framework of the Basic Law to the
details of post-1997 laws and institutions. In each of the key con-
troversies of the era, the P.R.C. and its allies in Hong Kong have in-
sisted that the laws and legislative foundations of S.A.R. institu-
tions must accord protection for sovereign discretion and satisfy
proceduralist notions of legitimacy, ideas that are central to the
P.R.C.'s positivist perspective. With respect to the same issues,
Hong Kong's liberal and pro-democracy elements and, to a signifi-
cant degree, its colonial government have stuck just as firmly to the
notion that the laws and institutions of the S.A.R. must meet de-
mands of substantive justice, a position that is at the heart of their
loosely shared naturalist vision.
3.1. The Bill of Rights
In 1991, the Hong Kong government adopted a Bill of Rights
Ordinance and began a series of amendments to colonial laws that
had previously restricted civil and political liberties. The Ordi-
nance was enacted largely in response to the Beijing leadership's
violent suppression of the 1989 Democracy Movement in the P.R.C.
and to what the suppression seemed to portend for post-1997
Hong Kong. The Ordinance provided, among other things, for
rights to liberty and security of person; freedom of thought, opin-
ion, expression, association, and peaceful assembly; participation
in public life; equal protection under the law; criminal due process;
freedom from torture; and humane treatment for people deprived
of their liberty. 24 The Ordinance also decreed that inconsistent pre-
existing legislation was repealed and that subsequent legislation
was to be construed where "it admits of such a construction ... so
as to be consistent" with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, key provisions of which the Ordinance explicitly
tracked.25 This provision was further "entrenched" in Hong Kong
24 See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, ch. 383, § 8 (1991). On the politi-
cal background of the Bill of Rights, see, for example, Emily Lau, Confidence Build-
ing, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 26, 1989, at 19 (quoting Hong Kong Attorney General
Jeremy Mathews and the British Foreign Secretary).
25 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance § 4 (1991).
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law by a simultaneous amendment to the Letters Patent, the British
law that serves as a principal part of Hong Kong's constitution.
Partly in response to the same sorts of political concerns and
pressures that prompted the Bill of Rights Ordinance, and also to
implement the broad promises of the Bill of Rights, the colonial
government undertook a number of eleventh-hour changes to laws
restricting peaceful political activities, including reforms to the
Public Order Ordinance (which had imposed license requirements
for public demonstrations) and the Societies Ordinance (which had
required government permission to establish political parties and
other associations and permitted restrictions on links to foreign or-
ganizations) .26
The P.R.C. and its allies in the territory rejected, primarily on
positivist grounds, any notion that the Bill of Rights and reforms to
specific legislation had any necessary impact beyond July 1, 1997.
Some provisions might be allowed to survive, but they would do
so at the sufferance of the Chinese state and its subordinate S.A.R.
organs, the entities that would be the real source of such laws' au-
thority. It was, a prominent Chinese spokesman on Hong Kong
stressed, the N.P.C. Standing Committee that would declare which
laws in Hong Kong should remain in force after 1997.27 Objection-
able provisions could be and would be reversed by procedurally
proper exercises of the P.R.C.'s sovereign legislative authority over
Hong Kong.28 Moreover, the P.R.C. had already made clear
through the Basic Law that the rights referred to in the Bill of
Rights would be protected under S.A.R. law, thus making the Ord-
inance's substantive provisions at best superfluous. 29
26 See Societies Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances, ch. 151 (amended 1992);
Public Order Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances, ch. 245 (amended 1995). See
generally, Diane Stormont, China Proposes Gutting HK Civil Liberties Laws, Reuters,
Jan. 20, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; C.K. Lau, Harsh Provi-
sions that Infringe on Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 25, 1994, at 18.
27 See Chris Yeung & Louis Won, Let S.A.R. Decide on Bill, Says Top Judge, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 30, 1995, at 1 (summarizing remarks of Zhang Jun-
sheng, deputy director of the Hong Kong Branch of Xinhua, the New China News
Agency, which has been the P.R.C.'s de facto embassy in Hong Kong); see also
China Says Reserves Right to Review Hong Kong Laws, Reuters, June 6, 1991 ("[Bei-
jing] reserves the right to examine at an appropriate time after 1997 the laws cur-
rently in force in Hong Kong.") (statement of Foreign Ministry spokesman Duan
Jin), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
28 See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, Hold Your Ground, FARE. ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995.
29 See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 39 (stating that provisions of the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights are to remain in force in Hong Kong
and be implemented through S.A.R. laws), arts. 24-42 (enumerating specific
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Further, the P.R.C. and its allies warned that the significant
changes that the Hong Kong government had sought to make via
new legislation could not be entrenched in S.A.R. law by means of
the P.R.C.'s unilateral undertaking (in the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law), that the "laws previously in force" in Hong Kong
would continue in effect.30 That promise covered only the laws as
they stood at the time the P.R.C. made the pledge in 1984.31 While
some flexibility to allow necessary legislation over thirteen years
was implied, the sweeping delegation of authority to change "ma-
jor laws" implied by the colonial government's enactment of hun-
dreds of new laws and amendments to key legislation entailed too
serious restrictions on the Chinese sovereign's discretion. Such a
prior, binding commitment to accept such extensive change was
"impossible." It would constitute a "blank check" approach to au-
thorizing pre-reversion legislation with post-1997 effect that was
unthinkable from a Chinese-style positivist perspective.
32
In addition, the P.R.C. and its allies in Hong Kong attacked the
substance of the late colonial legal reforms as unacceptably con-
straining of sovereign discretion.33 Having long enjoyed the bene-
fits of laws empowering them to restrict political activities in the
territory (and having repeatedly asserted their conformity with in-
ternational human rights standards), the colonial government had
belatedly moved to exclude such order-supporting and sovereign-
empowering assets from the dowry the P.R.C. and the S.A.R. gov-
ernment would receive in 1997.34 That the colonial government
rights). See also Xinhua Condemns Britain's Stand on Hong Kong Rights, Agence
France Presse, Jan. 29, 1997.
30 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 8, 160; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, an-
nex I.
31 See, e.g., Article Defends China's Position on Law Changes, TA KUNG PAO, Feb.
5, 1997 ("The term 'previously in force' . .. refers to the laws in force at the time of
the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration."); Tsang Yok-sing, Repeal Objec-
tions are Out of Order, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 4, 1997, at 16.
32 See Lu Ping Stresses Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended by British
Hong Kong Government is Intended to Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity and Stability,
WEN WEI PO, Jan. 26, 1997, at All; see also Article Defends China's Position on Law
Changes, supra note 31, at 10.
33 See, e.g., Peter Lim, Hong Kong's First Bill of Rights Targets China, Agence
France Presse, June 8, 1991.
34 See, e.g., Article Defends China's Position on Law Changes, supra note 31, at 10
(complaining that "a considerable number of amendments irrationally decentral-
ized the powers of the government, limited the functions of government... [and]
restricted the powers of the police and law-enforcement organs"); Frank Ching,
UN to Examine Patten Report, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 19, 1995, at 38 (describing the
Chinese view more generally); Stacy Mosher, Uncertain Rights, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
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had not strictly enforced many of the laws in recent years was of
little import to the P.R.C. Especially from the positivist perspective
to which the P.R.C. and its supporters adhered, those laws had re-
mained valid legislation available for the government's use.
Worse still, from the Chinese and pro-P.R.C. perspective, the
Bill of Rights purported to be a new kind of quasi-constitutional
and super-statutory law to which ordinary Hong Kong legislation
had to conform. 35 In addition to trying to "entrench" substantive
principles in a way that prior law had not, the Ordinance and the
changes to the Letters Patent assigned legislative and super-
legislative authority to the judiciary by means of the provisions
that declared pre-existing contrary legislation to be repealed, man-
dated Bill-of-Rights-compatible interpretation of subsequent stat-
utes, and gave the judiciary the authority to determine the incon-
sistency of prior ordinances and to undertake "conforming"
interpretations of subsequent legislation.36 From this perspective,
July 4, 1991, at 16 (citing the Chinese government concern that the bill might hin-
der post-1997 law enforcement); Chris Yeung, Tung in a Legal Tangle, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 17 ("Hardliners in Beijing" and Hong Kong's
"pro-China circle" see late colonial legal changes as "political plot by Britain to
make the S.A.R. ungovernable.").
35 See, e.g., Xinhua Criticizes Patten's "Alarmist Statement" in Bill of Rights Con-
troversy, Xinhua, Oct. 27, 1995 ("[The] British side ... unilaterally introduced ...
the 'Bill of Rights' and plac[ed] it above all other laws of Hong Kong."), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
36 The criticism was based primarily on the Bill of Rights Ordinance sec-
tion 3(2), which prescribed that all pre-existing legislation not admitting of a con-
struction consistent with the Bill of Rights Ordinance "is, to the extent of the in-
consistency, repealed;" implicitly on section 6, which provided for judicial
remedies and review for "violations;" on section 4, which directed that subse-
quent laws be construed so as to be compatible with the U.N. Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. See, e.g., Article Defends China's Position on Law Changes, supra
note 31, at 10; China on Safeguarding Sino-British Joint Declaration, Xinhua, Jan. 29,
1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. The criticism was also based
on the moves to entrench the Bill of Rights' substantive provisions by section 2(3)
of the Ordinance (contrary to established common law practice, pro-China sources
claimed) and paragraph 7(3) of the Letters Patent -British Parliamentary legisla-
tion that was the Basic Law's predecessor as a "constitutional" document for
Hong Kong that was beyond Hong Kong's power to amend. See, e.g., Article De-
fends China's Position on Law Changes, supra note 31, at 10. On the Letters Patent,
see PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG
KONG 321-22 (1994).
To understand the objection that the Ordinance gave the courts "legislative"
authority, it is important to recall that constitutional judicial review of legislation
in the American sense is not a part of Hong Kong's British-based legal system,
much less the P.R.C.'s civil law and socialist system. While criticisms of legislat-
ing from the bench are, of course, hardly alien in discussions of the role of the
courts in the United States, the notion of a court in effect striking down legislation
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the mandate to the judiciary and the attempts at substantive en-
trenchment, in effect, sought to make the Bill of Rights, and the in-
ternational human rights provisions it tracked, a category of law
that had not previously existed in Hong Kong and that clearly was
meant to restrict the exercise of at least that portion of China's sov-
ereign power that was to be delegated to the S.A.R. 37
These "structural" changes to expand judicial powers and to
create a new, higher type of law, the P.R.C. and its allies added,
had the additional positivist problem of being inconsistent with the
Basic Law and its assumptions of legal continuity. Accordingly,
they could not be accepted as laws for the S.A.R., given the Basic
Law's requirements that all S.A.R. laws conform to the Basic Law
and that prior laws that "contravene" the Basic Law would not
survive.38
The colonial government and the territory's indigenous liberal
and pro-democracy voices defended the Bill of Rights with largely
naturalist arguments about what fixed principles required Hong
Kong's government to provide to its citizens. 39 The Bill of Rights'
for nonconformity with a written quasi-constitutional document or undertaking
potentially reconstructive interpretations of statutory text looks more radical in
the British system, with its norms of parliamentary supremacy and the absence of
a written constitution, and in the P.R.C.'s system where principles of parliamenta-
ry supremacy and judicial accountability to legislative organs are constitutionally
mandated. Hong Kong's system has been a bit closer to the U.S. system in that
the courts have had authority to strike down legislation as beyond the limited,
delegated authority of the Governor and Legislative Council, and in that the high-
est court for colonial Hong Kong has been the Privy Council in London, which is,
of course, not subordinate to the Hong Kong legislature. See generally id. at 154-63,
186-95. Still, the power that China alleged the Bill of Rights Ordinance conferred
on Hong Kong courts would mark a substantial departure from these high base-
lines of judicial power in Hong Kong. The robust role of the courts in the territory
was probably not, in any event, well understood or accepted in P.R.C. circles
charged with addressing Hong Kong questions.
37 Comments from Hong Kong legal officials when the colonial government
was considering a Bill of Rights added to Chinese concerns, with Attorney Gen-
eral Jeremy Mathews declaring that a Bill of Rights would be "supreme" over
other Hong Kong law. See Lau, Confidence Building, supra note 24, at 19. Later
commentary sought to backpeddle, prompting Chinese spokesmen to claim that
the Hong Kong government sought to "deceive the Hong Kong people" when it
belatedly denied that the Bill of Rights was supposed to be "supreme." See Chris
Yeung & No Kwai-yan, Beijing Slams Bill "Lies"; Officials "Deceiving Hong Kong
People and Misleading Public Opinion," S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 15, 1995, at 1.
38 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 8, 160; see also Xinhua Criticizes Patten's
"Alarmist Statement" in Bill of Rights Controversy, supra note 35.
39 As one Legco member explained during the debates on the Bill of Rights,
in a passage later quoted approvingly by Governor Patten, "It is incumbent upon
us as legislators ... to ensure that we will entrench essential freedoms in line
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principles for reforming substantive laws and specific changes to
laws were, on this view, simply the right thing to do. Arguments
in this vein frequently made reference to international human
rights norms, assumedly of universal application (and codified in
key United Nations covenants), that the changes in Hong Kong law
were meant to reflect.
40
From this liberal perspective, it was significant that the British
colonial government in recent years had acted in ways generally
consistent with appropriate standards that were only later adopted
as positive law. Indeed, the minimal (but not sole) aim of the Bill
of Rights and amendments to specific laws was to preserve the gen-
erally just (if not fully adequate) legal order that Hong Kong had
enjoyed in practice and that seemed vulnerable, given the ap-
proaching takeover by a regime with a substantially more check-
ered record.41
Tellingly, one aspect of the P.R.C.'s attack on the Bill of Rights
that was particularly troubling to liberal lawyer-politicians and le-
gally sophisticated government officials in Hong Kong was the
P.R.C.'s objection to the Ordinance as new form of super-statutory
law. Beyond establishing a prospective rule of statutory construc-
tion, all that the Ordinance did in this area, its defenders insisted,
was to provide for statute-based judicial review of challenged laws
that not only was utterly conventional in Hong Kong, but was also
central to any notion of accountable and law-governed government
that accorded any significant role to courts.
42
with" the human rights standards recited in the U.N. Convention on Civil and Po-
litical Rights. Paul Cheng, No Danger of Making Bill of Rights U-Turn, S. CHINA
MORNING POsT, Jan. 27, 1997, at 18.
40 See, e.g., Louise do Rosario, No Watchdog, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 7, 1994, at
26 (quoting human rights activist and academic Nihal Jayawickrama and Legco
member Christine Loh). The text of the Bill of Rights Ordinance itself refers spe-
cifically to the U.N. Covenants, in section 4, and is, in this respect, presumably
meant to track article 39 of the Basic Law.
41 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Voice of the People, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 8, 1989, at 18
(then-reporter and later leading liberal Legco member Lau noting the Hong Kong
government's tolerance of local rallies in support of the students at Tiananmen
despite such activities being in "direct violation" of the Public Order Ordinance);
Christine Loh, Nothing to Fear from China if We Stand Firm, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 18 (pro-democracy Legco member, describing Beijing's plans to
reverse Bill of Rights as an effort "to prevent Hong Kong people from enjoying the
freedoms we have grown used to").
42 On this side of the debate as well, the key provisions were sections 3, 4 and
6. See also Loh, supra note 41, at 18 (Legco member describing Bill of Rights as "in
strict legal interpretation ... only an ordinary law like any other piece of legisla-
tion in Hong Kong. But because it sets minimum standards, the Government and
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3.2. The Legislature
In 1992, Hong Kong's new governor, Christopher Patten, an-
nounced proposals to broaden the democratic base of the last colo-
nial Legislative Council ("Legco"), which was to "ride a through
train" to become the S.A.R.'s first legislature. Adding nine new
functional constituencies with electorates that collectively took in
most of the territory's potential voters, expanding the base for sev-
eral of the twenty-one existing functional constituencies, providing
for the direct election by universal suffrage of members represent-
ing twenty single-member districts, and establishing a mechanism
of indirect popular election for another ten representatives (by an
election committee composed of directly elected members of local
government bodies), the reformed laws provided for a Legco in
which two-thirds or more of the sixty members would have some
claim to a popular electoral mandate. 43 Patten's strategy also in-
cluded increasing the effective role of Legco in the governance of
the territory by submitting for its unconstrained debate, and poten-
tial rejection, legislation concerning many of the key issues of the
transition, including the reforms to the electoral structure for Legco
and bills to establish the Court of Final Appeal for the S.A.R.
The P.R.C. and its backers in Hong Kong attacked the Patten
reforms and declared that the Legco elected in 1995 under those
laws would be dissolved on July 1, 1997.44 The arguments again
reflected a Chinese-style positivist vision. Some Chinese leaders
the judiciary are prepared to check other laws against its."); Wang Hui Ling, HK
Blasts Bid to Scrap Parts of Bill of Rights, STRArrS TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 21, 1997, at
17 (Patten criticizing proposed changes as "bad news" striking "at the heart of
Hongkong's civil liberties" and arguing that the Bill of Rights provisions to which
China objected did not seek to override the Basic Law and were standard provi-
sions in common law jurisdictions).
43 For general discussions of the Patten electoral reforms, see Lo Chi-kin,
From "Through Train to Second Stove," in FROM COLONY TO S.A.R. 25, 28; Frank
Ching, Cleared for Action, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 20. Patten's reforms
effected a number of other changes as well, including lowering the voting age to
18 and democratizing the process for selecting members of lower-level bodies.
44 The threat to derail the "through train" was made on numerous occasions,
some before Patten formally proposed his reform plan. The most formal state-
ment of China's position came in a September 1994 unanimous resolution by the
N.P.C. "to abolish the political structure based on Governor Chris Patten's elec-
toral reform package." Louise do Rosario, Derailed, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 22,
1994, at 36; see also Emily Lau, No More 'Concessions,' FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 30,
1989, at 13 (describing an early warning from Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Of-
fice deputy director Li Hou of possible derailment if Britain made too-rapid
changes in Hong Kong).
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saw a dark plot to compromise the P.R.C.'s sovereignty over Hong
Kong after 1997 by using democratization of the Legco selection
process and the less formal expansion of Legco's role in govern-
ment to create an independent base for subversion.
45
The most emphasized problem with Patten's electoral law re-
form, however, was its "non-conformity" with the Basic Law, as
well as the Joint Declaration and secret Sino-British agreements
concerning the method for selecting members of the transitional
era legislature.46 The governor had "perfidious[ly] disregarded"
the Basic Law, "a dignified document which should be strictly ob-
served" and which could be interpreted only by the N.P.C. Stand-
ing Committee, not by "the British side or Chris Patten himself."47
Specifically, Patten had introduced broader elections -particularly
through the new functional constituencies and expansion of old
ones -earlier and for a larger portion of Legco than the framework
of positive law and sovereign permission from the P.R.C. allowed.
Among its other problems, the Patten package violated the Basic
Law's mandate for the development of Legco selection methods
"in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly prog-
ress."48
For the P.R.C. and its supporters and surrogates in Hong Kong,
it followed that the last colonial Legco could not become the
S.A.R.'s initial legislature. The relevant positive law did not re-
quire it. The N.P.C.'s 1990 "Decision," together with Annex II to
the Basic Law, provided for the "through train," but conditioned it
upon the last colonial Legco's "composition" being "in conformity"
with the Decision's requirements that twenty members be chosen
by geographical constituencies, ten by an election committee and
thirty by functional constituencies. 49 According to the Chinese and
pro-P.R.C. reading, Patten's reforms had meant that the 1995-
45 See Li Haiting, "Basic Law" Essentially Ensures Democracy for Hong Kong Peo-
ple, Xinhua, Jan. 9. 1994, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Tai Ming
Cheung, Glacial Thaw, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 22, 1993, at 13 (quoting Shiu Sin-por,
head of the pro-China One Country, Two Systems Economic Research Institute).
46 See Tai Ming Cheung, Pressure Tactics, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 5, 1992, at 8
(statements of Lu Ping, chief of P.R.C. State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Af-
fairs Office).
47 Does Chris Patten Want Cooperation or Confrontation?, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 24,
1996, at 2.
48 Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 68; Text of Chinese Statement on the Breakdown of
Sino-British Talks on Hong Kong, Xinhua, Mar. 2, 1994, available at LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File.
49 Basic Law, supra note 2, annex II.
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chosen Legco failed to meet that condition.50 Functional constitu-
encies meant narrow, corporate voting, not the broad electorates
the Patten reforms would introduce for many of those seats.
Moreover, as the Chinese authorities and their Hong Kong af-
filiates saw it, the first S.A.R. legislature would have to receive its
authority in good positivist fashion from the Chinese sovereign.
Even if the "through train" arrangement had held, it would not
have meant that the last colonial legislature would have survived
the transition, outliving the political entity whose component or-
gan it was. Rather, the people who served in the last Legco would
have been reappointed as members of a new S.A.R. institution that
would be purely a creature of P.R.C. legislation and could have
P.R.C.-established criteria for membership.51
With the through train derailed, this line of argument contin-
ued, the P.R.C. was free to establish a Provisional Legislature for
the territory and to invest it with whatever sovereign authority it
thought wise (at least within the limits of what the Basic Law
mandated). As the P.R.C. and its supporters construed the Basic
Law and N.P.C. Decision on the Formation of the First Legislative
Council of the S.A.R., there was nothing in the relevant framework
of positive law to preclude establishing such a body once the
through train was no longer possible. On this view, the N.P.C. De-
cision, in authorizing the Preparatory Committee ("P.C.") to "take
care of all matters concerning the preparations for the setting up"
of the S.A.R., had given the P.C. authority to establish a Provisional
Legislature if need be. If there were any doubt, the N.P.C. could
simply issue a legislative interpretation of the Basic Law to author-
ize clearly the temporary body's creation.52
50 See generally Nomination of Provisional Legislature Candidates Formally Starts,
WEN WEI Po, Nov. 18, 1996, at A2; Text of Zhou Nan Speech to First Session of the
Provisional Legislature for the Hong Kong S.A.R., TA KUNG PAO, Jan. 26, 1997, at A2
(speech by Xinhua Hong Kong Director and Preparatory Committee ("P.C.") Vice
Chairman Zhou Nan).
51 See, e.g., Frank Ching, Don't Subvert Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 18,
1993, at 34 (describing Chinese plans to scrutinize potential reappointees for in-
volvement in "subversive" activities, should the through train model in general
survive the conflict over the Patten reforms); David Chu, Fact and Fiction in the
New Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Nov. 14, 1996, at 18; Text of Chinese
Statement on the Breakdown of Sino-British Talks on Hong Kong, supra note 48. A key
textual basis for part of the P.R.C. position was the N.P.C. Decision provision stat-
ing that "those of [the last colonial Legco] members who . . . meet the require-
ments set forth in the Basic Law... may, upon confirmation by the Preparatory Com-
mittee, become members of the first Legislature of the Region." (emphasis added).
52 See N.P.C. Decision, supra note 9; Nomination of Provisional Legislature Candi-
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As a more general matter, a unilateral move to establish a local
S.A.R. legislature would be an acceptable action, well within the
plenary powers that the P.R.C. enjoyed as Hong Kong's sover-
eign.53 The P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies pressed this point fur-
ther, in recent months even asserting that the Provisional Legisla-
ture meeting in Shenzhen could begin considering proposed laws
for post-reversion Hong Kong.54
Official Chinese sources and like-minded voices in the territory
also suggested that there were good positivist reasons for making
sure a Provisional Legislature was in place on July 1, and that there
was no legal impediment to doing so. Absent such a body, there
would be no local organ to exercise the legislative functions that
the Basic Law conferred and to make indispensable laws in the
early days of the S.A.R. Such a "legislative vacuum" would be a
troubling and untidy state of affairs.55
In part, the defense of the Patten reforms and the denunciations
of the Provisional Legislature from official quarters in Hong Kong
met the P.R.C. side's arguments on their own terms. Patten de-
clared his changes to the electoral rules for Legco to be consistent
with the Basic Law. The colonial government and Hong Kong
politicians objected to the establishment of a Provisional Legisla-
ture and its claims to pre-reversion authority as, among other
things, inconsistent with the arrangements set forth in the Basic
Law and the Joint Declaration.56
dates Formally Starts, supra note 50, at A2; see also Linda Choy, Attempt to Affirm
Legislature's Legal Status, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at 4 (describing ar-
guments from pro-China Hong Kong groups that the N.P.C. should issue a new
legislative interpretation of the Basic Law to provide clear authority for the estab-
lishment of the Provisional Legislature); Procedures for Formation of Provisional Leg-
islature Are Impartial and Open, WEN WEI Po, July 9, 1996, at A2 (summarizing
qualifications established for candidates for membership in Provisional Legisla-
ture).
53 See, e.g., Nomination of Provisional Legislature Candidates Formally Starts, su-
pra note 50, at A2.
54 See, e.g., Provisional Legislature Must Be Set Up as Scheduled, TA KUNG PAO,
Oct. 8, 1996, at A2; Provisional Legislature Must Operate Before 1997, WEN WEI PO,
Aug. 31, 1996, at A2.
55 See, e.g., Dominic Lau, China Founds 1997 HK Legislature, Defies Britain,
Reuters, Dec. 21, 1996 (quoting Foreign Minister Qian Qichen), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Nomination of Provisional Legislature Candidates Formally
Starts, supra note 50, at A2 (stating that the Provisional Legislature needed to
avoid the "legal vacuum"); Provisional Legislature Must Operate Before 1997, supra
note 54, at A2 (making a similar statement).
56 See Frank Ching, China Calls a Deer a Horse, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 8, 1994,
at 32 (claiming that the Provisional Legislature is incompatible with the Basic
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Still, most of the arguments from the colonial government and
liberal and democratic circles in Hong Kong sounded a less posi-
tivistic note. In principle, what made the Patten reforms defensi-
ble, and even obligatory, was their vital contribution to establish-
ing a set of law-making (and other governmental) institutions for
Hong Kong that would represent the will of the territory's citizens,
provide public accountability and undergird the rule of law. Thus,
they would provide, both directly and indirectly, the primary
"goods" of a naturalist liberal conception of a proper legal and po-
litical order. 57
In addition, the understanding in these quarters of the through
train model for Legco seems to have paid little heed to the P.R.C.'s
positivist metaphysics of giving old office-holders new sources of
authority. The point, rather, seems to have been that a relatively
democratically chosen, and therefore fairly legitimate, group of
representatives to a quasi-legislative body would simply remain in
office, undisturbed by the transition.5 8 Indeed, it was the P.R.C.'s
new appointive body, the Provisional Legislature, that was "repre-
hensible," "unjustifiable," and had "a legitimacy problem," not
least because it included several failed candidates from the 1995
balloting.5 9 Its lack of real democratic (as well as positivist statu-
Law); Policy Address of Governor Patten, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1996, at 4
(stating that democratization efforts have been "in line with the undertakings sol-
emnly accepted by Britain and China"); Tung Attacks Britain, HK for Refusing to
Recognize Appointed Assembly, Agence France Presse, Dec. 17, 1996 (quoting Martin
Lee's "challenge [to] the Provisional Legislature ... to operate in Hong Kong,"
which would allow Lee to "take them to the courts [to] decide whether it's consti-
tutional or not" or in violation of the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration).
57 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Letter from Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 9, 1992,
at 24 (describing a Legco member arguing that "speeding up the pace of democ-
racy" was a matter of "necessity and desirability" with a requirement that "at
least half of Legco be directly elected in 1995" as "an absolute minimum" in order
to make possible the "high degree of autonomy" promised to Hong Kong and to
avoid a "morally [inidefensible" result that returning Hong Kong to China threat-
ened to produce); Martin Lee, Tide of Democracy, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 26, 1992,
at 31 (describing a Legco member arguing that "without democratic and account-
able government, we will never be able to maintain the rule of law"); Policy Ad-
dress of Governor Patten, supra note 56, at 4 (linking the democracy of 1995 elections
with government openness and accountability).
58 See, e.g., Patten Behaviour, FARE. ECON. REV., Dec. 7, 1995 (British Minister of
State with responsibility for Hong Kong declaring, "the British government, like
the Hong Kong government, sees no reason why" the 1995-elected Legco "should
not serve its full, natural four-year term"; former senior Hong Kong civil servant
arguing that "the people of the colony are entitled to have a free say in the shape
of the future Hong Kong government" via their elected representatives).
59 See Tung Attacks Britain, HK for Refusing to Recognise Appointed Assembly,
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tory) legitimacy could not be cured.60
3.3. The Court of Final Appeal
In 1995, the colonial government enacted a Court of Final Ap-
peal Law which provided, among other things, for a court that
would be established only at the transition, that would include, as
a "temporary member" only one jurist from a foreign common law
jurisdiction on its five-member bench, and that would not have ju-
risdiction over "acts of state such as foreign affairs and defense" or
to interpret Basic Law provisions governing relations between the
S.A.R. and the Central People's Government.
61
Generally pleased with the legislation, official P.R.C. sources
and like-minded unofficial sources in Hong Kong mounted a less
sustained analysis of the court ordinance's status. Still, there are
hints of familiar styles of argument. When the colonial authorities
threatened to act unilaterally to establish a court, the P.R.C. re-
sponded in the same terms as it had to the impasse over the legisla-
ture: anything that the outgoing government did on its own and
without the P.R.C.'s authorization, the P.R.C. would be free to dis-
mantle and replace.62 At an earlier impasse in the negotiations
leading to the second court deal, the P.R.C. raised the possibility of
establishing a review body superior to the C.F.A., a move which
could be defended on positivistic grounds that it was not forbid-
den by the Basic Law (which provided for the S.A.R.'s "judicial
autonomy" but was silent on the specific question of a supra-
C.F.A. body) and was generally within the P.R.C.'s sovereign dis-
cretion to establish.
Regarding more specific issues, there were suggestions that the
P.R.C. saw a larger number of foreign judges as potentially threat-
ening to erode the judicial dimension of Chinese sovereignty over
Agence France Presse, Dec. 17, 1996 (quoting Patten); see also Quinton Chan &
Clarence Tsui, Patten Blasts Scrapping of Laws, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2,
1997, at 2; Martin Lee, The Wrong Message from China, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
13, 1997, at 19.
60 See, e.g., Martin Lee, Hong Kong Puppet Play, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1996, at 25.
61 Court of Final Appeal: The Text in Full, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10,
1995, at 2 (presenting the text of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group Agreement
on C.F.A.); see also Louise do Rosario, A Court Too Far, FAR E. EcoN. REV., June 22,
1995, at 20 (describing the C.F.A. agreement and bill of 1995); Lu Ping on HK's
Court of Final Appeal, Xinhua, May 18, 1995 (quoting the Director of Hong Kong
and Macau Affairs Office), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
62 See, e.g., Frank Ching, Split in Beijing Over Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Apr. 13, 1995, at 34.
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Hong Kong. By world standards, the P.R.C. had been uncom-
monly generous in permitting even one foreign national to serve in
so sensitive and powerful a position.63 Moreover, nothing in the
relevant positive laws required more than one judge. As a matter
of valid statutory construction, the Basic Law article providing for
"judges" from a foreign common law jurisdiction did not require
more than one. Indeed, the P.R.C.'s top official on Hong Kong af-
fairs explained on the eve of the second C.F.A. deal, the legal ar-
rangement the P.R.C. had in mind would still leave the question of
the number of foreign judges open for case-by-case, discretionary
determination. The four-to-one ratio, Lu Ping explained, was be-
tween "permanent" and "temporary" members of the court. Be-
cause both locals and foreigners could be on either list, the number
of expatriates could range from zero to four (with the Chief Justice
required to be a Chinese citizen and permanent S.A.R. resident).64
The fact that the court would not be up-and-running in ad-
vance of the shift to Chinese rule gave no reason for concern. In
part a product of Legco's 1991 vote not to support a proposal very
similar to the one it endorsed in 1995, the relatively late establish-
ment of the court still avoided the relevant danger from a positivist
perspective. As Chinese and pro-P.R.C. commentators stressed,
the 1995 law meant that July 1, 1997, would not bring a "judicial
vacuum" that the Provisional Legislature would have to scramble
to fill by crafting entirely new legislation to set up and staff the top
level of the judiciary. 65
Finally, the jurisdiction-limiting provisions were also accept-
able, even necessary, from a Chinese-style positivist perspective.
Granting greater powers to a local court, the P.R.C.'s spokesmen
and supporters seemed to suggest, would risk a dangerous alien-
ation of central sovereign authority. In any event, the relevant
positive laws again permitted such restrictions on the court's
power: the Basic Law mandated the limits to the court's power to
63 Cf. One Foreign Judge is Enough, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 6, 1994, at 26.
64 See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 82. From this perspective, more textual
help was to be found in the equally authoritative Chinese version's use of faguan,
translated well as "judge" or "judges," and the proviso that foreigners could be
invited to serve "as required," which could mean, under appropriate circum-
stances, no foreign judges. The Joint Declaration language is virtually identical.
See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, annex I § III. For Hong Kong and Macau Af-
fairs Office Director Lu Ping's argument, see Lu Ping on HK's Court of Final Appeal,
Xinhua, May 18, 1995, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
65 See, e.g., Text of Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal Agree-
ment, WEN WEI PO, June 10, 1995, at A2.
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interpret the Basic Law, and contained "act of state" language
identical to that adopted in the C.F.A. Ordinance.66 Should the co-
lonial government of Hong Kong fail to enact a law establishing
the court, Chinese legal officials argued, the N.P.C. was authorized
under the Basic Law (as well as the Chinese constitution) to pass
C.F.A.-creating legislation containing the appropriate jurisdictional
(and other) limits permitted or required by the Basic Law.
67
A few of the counter-arguments from Hong Kong critics of the
court deal were cast in terms that the P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. side
could find unobjectionable in form, if not persuasive in content.
Some, for example, argued that the statutory term "judges" from
foreign jurisdictions meant more than one judge.68 But, here too, a
very different, more naturalist perspective drove most of the
analysis by the bills' opponents and by proponents who were not
generally part of the pro-P.R.C. camp. For colonial officials and lo-
cal politicians of a generally liberal or democratic stripe, the prin-
cipal touchstone of the C.F.A. bills' adequacy was their compatibil-
ity with the preservation of Hong Kong's rule-of-law system and
values.
A place for one or more foreign common law jurists on the
highest bench was important as a means of assuring a degree of in-
sulation from political pressure and, therefore, independence suffi-
cient to defend the transcendent norms of limited and accountable
government and individual justice that the common law, at its best,
developed and protected.69 If the limits on the court's jurisdiction
were objectionable, this was primarily because they threatened to
undermine the achievement of government accountability and
government under law.70 The belated establishment of the court
66 See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 19.
67 See Stacy Mosher, Court of Contention, FAR. E. ECON. REV., Dec. 19, 1991, at
11 (quoting former Basic Law Drafting Committee member Wu Jianfan, invoking
article 82 of the Basic Law as authorization for an N.P.C.-enacted C.F.A. law).
68 See, e.g., C.K. Lau, Judging the Judges, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Aug. 23,
1995, at 19.
69 See Mosher, supra note 67, at 10 (describing Legco supporters of the motion
to reject the 1991 C.F.A. Bill as concerned that accepting the limitation on the
number of foreign judges portended possible curtailment of "other rights and
freedoms" that Hong Kong people believed were "cast in iron" by the Joint Decla-
ration and Basic Law); Louise do Rosario, Cold Shoulder, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 1,
1995, at 25 (describing Legco members' concern that limiting the court to one for-
eign judge would "compromise the flexibility and professionalism" of the court).
70 See Courting Disaster, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 5 (noting the
P.R.C.'s potentially expansive definition of acts of state).
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was a problem, if at all, because it raised the prospect that the
court, in practice, would lack the kind of experience and clout nec-
essary to support the obligatory norms of good and just laws and
governance, regardless of the court's composition or formal juris-
diction.71
3.4. The Chief Executive
The legal framework for selecting the S.A.R.'s first Chief Execu-
tive, the official who would head the most powerful branch of the
S.A.R.'s government, was settled early on.72 An Annex to the Basic
Law and a separate N.P.C. Decision provided that a Selection
Committee drawn in specified proportions from different segments
of Hong Kong society would recommend a candidate through "lo-
cal consultations or through nomination and election after consul-
tations, and report the recommended candidate to the Central
People's Government for appointment."73 In December 1996, the
office of Chief Executive became the first of the new S.A.R. posts to
have a formally designated initial occupant, with the naming of the
members of the Provisional Legislature following shortly thereaf-
ter.
Although not fully articulated with respect to a set of issues
that were early and securely settled on acceptable terms, the Chi-
nese and pro-P.R.C. position on the Chief Executive selection proc-
ess was fully in step with a familiar positivist perspective. The fill-
ing of this most powerful post for exercising the elements of the
P.R.C.'s sovereign authority allocated to the S.A.R. was a matter
that the legislation governing the S.A.R. kept fairly firmly in the
71 See, e.g., Stacy Mosher, Right of Rejection, FAR E. ECON. REv., Oct. 31, 1991, at
13 (stating that setting up the court as soon as possible would permit the devel-
opment of "an established international reputation" before reversion); Louise do
Rosario, No Appeal, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 18, 1995, at 22 (describing the colonial
government's push for "rapid establishment of the court, which is designed to
protect the rule of law," and local politicians favoring "a truly independent
court"); see also Margaret Ng, Time Runs Out for the Judiciary, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 14, 1996, at 21 (articulating the concerns of Legco member representing
the legal functional constituency).
72 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 43-58 (describing the powers and func-
tions of the Chief Executive).
73 N.P.C. Decision, supra note 9, §§ 3-4; Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 45, annex I
§ 6. Subsequent occupants of the office would be chosen by an Election Commit-
tee double the size of, but similar in composition to, the initial Selection Commit-
tee, with the goal of moving ultimately to a system of universal suffrage. See Basic
Law, supra note 2, art. 45, annex I §§ 1-5.
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central Chinese state's ultimate grasp.74 Beijing could have kept
the process entirely in its hands, one pro-P.R.C. source empha-
sized, but instead chose to set up a more elaborate mechanism al-
lowing local input.75 Whatever criticisms might flow from Hong
Kong about a P.R.C.-orchestrated charade of democracy, the P.R.C.
had been careful to assure that the Basic Law and other sources au-
thorized the formal process followed in selecting Tung Chee-hwa
as Chief Executive-designate. Moreover, official Chinese sources
and pro-P.R.C. Hong Kong media argued strenuously that the le-
gally prescribed process had been faithfully observed: there was
no "predetermined" result to the selection process, and the method
of consultation with local interests contemplated by the Basic Law
was being implemented, providing the people of Hong Kong with
the legally requisite level of input, and more than the British had
ever provided in a century and a half of colonial rule.
76
As with the legislature and the court, the P.R.C. here too
showed its positivist abhorrence of a vacuum. Far more than the
court, and more than the legislature, the chief executive has a good
deal of work to do before the reversion. An early selection to the
office was necessary (and necessarily somewhat undemocratic,
given that the P.R.C. could not conduct pre-1997 elections in Hong
Kong) if the S.A.R. government was to be ready to exercise the
powers and perform the governmental duties that the P.R.C. had
assigned to it through the Basic Law.
77
In addition, Tung's pointed dropping of the qualifying
"-designate" from his new title (with the P.R.C.'s acceptance) and
his weighing in on the controversy over the propriety of late colo-
nial amendments to civil and political liberties laws echoed the
broadly positivist point the P.R.C. was pressing in asserting the
74 If control over the selection process were not enough, the Basic Law pro-
vided additional legal levers of control over the Chief Executive, providing in ar-
ticle 43 that the Chief Executive "shall be accountable to the Central People's Gov-
ernment" as well as to "the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."
75 See Tsang Yok-sing, Skeptics Off Mark Over Chief Executive, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 3, 1996, at 18.
76 See, e.g., Linda Choy, It's a First for Democracy, Says Qian, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 3; The "Predetermination" Theory is Created for Instigating
Confrontation with China, TA KUNG PAO, Nov. 9, 1996, at 10; Become Masters of Our
Own Affairs, Incorporate Different Views, WEN WEI Po, Aug. 12, 1996, at A2; Wang
Hui Ling, We Have No Favourite for HK Chief Exec: Qian, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore),
Nov. 16, 1996, at 20 (quoting Foreign Minister and Vice-Premier Qian Qichen).
77 See, e.g., Face Reality Squarely, Promote Cooperation, TA KUNG PAO, Feb. 13,
1997, at A2.
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Provisional Legislature's pre-1997 authority. Given the premise of
the P.R.C.'s longstanding claim to a nonderogable sovereignty over
Hong Kong that was not and could not have been transferred to
Britain, there was nothing in principle that could stop the P.R.C.
from asserting that sovereignty at any time, so long as it did so
through procedurally proper, positivist means. According to crit-
ics, the P.R.C. saw this as requiring compliance with only the most
narrow readings of the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, inter-
pretations that perhaps forbade the direct and immediate exercise
of pre-1997 governmental power, but little else.78
Liberal and pro-democracy critics in Hong Kong treated as ir-
relevant the P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. side's arguments that the selec-
tion process was positivistically valid and statute-regarding. The
problems these critics stressed were, not surprisingly, substantive
and normative shortcomings offensive to a liberal and naturalist
perspective. Principally, the process had been so controlled by the
P.R.C. (with Tung's implicit anointment coming in the form of a
February 1996 handshake with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin) that
norms of accountability to the governed in Hong Kong had been
violated early on with respect to this most significant of S.A.R. of-
fices.79 The process was too remote from the avowed longer term
goal of universal suffrage-based election to warrant much respect
and credibility in democratic quarters.80 Moreover, even before
Tung's de facto selection became clear, the short list of candidates
acceptable to the P.R.C. was dominated by those who seemed very
unlikely to regard the office as one that carried obligations to up-
hold the largely liberal and democratic norms that many Hong
Kong politicians and the Governor saw as central to just and valid
laws and government. From this perspective, it was significant
and distressing that former Chief Justice Sir Yang Ti Liang had ex-
pressed reservations about the Bill of Rights as a grant of legisla-
78 See generally Bruce Gilley, Jumping the Gun, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 6, 1997,
at 14.
79 See Bruce Gilley, Playing Favourites, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 8, 1996, at 22;
Bruce Gilley, The Common Touch, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 21, 1996, at 34.
80 The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee had supported this
line early on (according to critics, to relieve pressure to permit greater immigra-
tion to the U.K. from Hong Kong), calling in 1989 for democratic elections for the
chief executive by early 1997. See Emily Lau, Abide with Me, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
July 13, 1989, at 11. Some Hong Kong pro-democracy politicians were quite stri-
dent in their critiques of the "sham" election. See C.K. Lau, A Question of Trust, S.
CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 12, 1996, at 21; Emily Lau, Our Duty to Expose Election
Charade, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 25, 1996, at 26.
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tive power to the judiciary, and that Tung Chee-hwa, early in his
tenure as Chief Executive-designate, had made clear his view that
liberal reforms to public order laws endangered social order and
should be revised.
81
4. INDETERMINATE VISIONS, HONG KONG POLITICS, AND THE
QUESTION OF "RULE OF LAW" VALUES
When the struggle to shape Hong Kong's future shifted to such
concrete matters concerning the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the tran-
sition era Legislature, the Court of Final Appeal deal, and the selec-
tion of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive, the change in focus did lit-
tle to bridge the gap between the notions of domestic sovereignty
and lawmaking that divided the principal participants into two
camps. As we have seen, each side remained committed to the
proposition that the laws and institutions for the S.A.R. had to be
legitimate in terms of its vision. Indeed, the conflict in some re-
spects sharpened. With the advent of the endgame, fundamental
disagreements about the standards of validity could no longer be
hidden in abstractions and generalities or postponed for resolution
in a later round of negotiations. At the same time, the P.R.C.'s vio-
lent suppression of the pro-democracy movement in the mainland
in 1989, and Governor Patten's introduction of political reforms
that the P.R.C. deemed provocative in 1992 brought a new air of
mutual mistrust to the process. The deepening clash, however, is
only one side of a more complex story.
4.1. Indeterminate Visions
Seemingly paradoxically, while the endgame thus continued
and arguably stiffened each side's insistence upon its own version
of the proper basis and minimally acceptable content of S.A.R. laws
and institutions, the endgame also brought a shift in focus to ques-
tions for which broad visions of law and sovereignty dictated no
single answer. In key conflicts over matters of legal and institu-
tional detail, the visions have been indeterminate, and their adher-
81 See Chief Executive Says "Colonial Laws" Not to be Adopted, Xinhua, Jan. 24,
1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Bruce Gilley, Enter the Judge,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 12, 1996, at 14; Danny Gittings, The Case for Challenging
China, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at 9 (concerning Yang); Peter Lim,
Democrats, Human Rights Groups Slam Hong Kong's Tung on Law Change, Agence
France Presse, Jan. 24, 1997 (concerning Tung); Tung Says PC Legal Panel Recom-
mendation is Right, Xinhua, Jan. 23, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File.
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ents' positions on specific issues flexible and varied.
From the P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. perspective, the principle that
S.A.R. laws and institutions had to have a proper proceduralist
pedigree and could not unduly restrict sovereign discretion often
said little about many of the substantive concerns of the moment.
Changes in this camp's positions on such matters, and discernible
differences among its members's views, reflect the indeterminacy.
For example, official Chinese sources sometimes insisted that the
Bill of Rights as a whole and all of the substantive changes
wrought by the Bill of Rights Ordinance and other eleventh-hour
statutory reforms were ripe for reversal. 82 At other times, the
P.R.C. and its Hong Kong affiliates, while unwavering in their
view that the colonial authorities' actions were illegitimate (par-
ticularly in trying to create a new, supreme type of law), focused
more narrowly on lists of specific legal reforms that had to be re-
versed. Those lists varied somewhat over time, with the Prelimi-
nary Working Committee (P.W.C.) first emphasizing six offensive
laws and later proposing a much longer list that the P.C. shortened
to twelve, and modified again in its formal recommendations to
the N.P.C. (which the N.P.C. has accepted). 83 Pro-P.R.C. elements
in Hong Kong were sometimes relatively circumspect, saying that
a broad repeal of the Bill of Rights would be unwise or unneces-
sary, demanding only that some of its more troubling provisions
be removed and the worst of the changes to other ordinances re-
versed. 84
82 See, e.g., China Softens Its Line, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 4, 1993 (de-
scribing Lu Ping's retreat from threatening to repeal the Bill of Rights to requiring
that it be modified to conform to the Basic Law); Emily Lau, Better Late Than Never,
FAR E. ECON. REV., July 12, 1990, at 16 (summarizing Chinese official reaction to
the initial Bill of Rights proposal).
83 On the proposals of the P.R.C.-established Preliminary Working Commit-
tee ("P.W.C.") (the body established to pave the way for the transition-overseeing
P.C.) see, for example, China Comes Courting, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995, at 7;
Bruce Gilley, Hold Your Ground, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995, at 36. On the
P.C.'s approach, see Lu Ping Stresses Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended
by British Hong Kong Government Is Intended to Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity and
Stability, supra note 32, at All; Suggestions of the Preparatory Committee of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the National People's Congress on Handling the
Issue of Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong, Xinhua, Feb. 4, 1997, available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
84 See, e.g., Connie Law, Plea for China to Keep Rights Bill, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 17, 1995, at 4 (quoting P.W.C. legal subgroup member's view that it
would be better not to repeal the Bill of Rights); Catherine Ng, Curbing Rights Bill
"Bad Precedent," S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at 2 (quoting Democratic
Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong leader Tsang Yok-sing, "The Bill of
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Similarly, while Patten's electoral reforms were deemed unac-
ceptable, the P.R.C. and its allies could contemplate any number of
positivistically valid arrangements for a transitional-era legislature,
including the initial through-train model, an appointive provi-
sional legislature some of whose members could be drawn from
the last Legco (as in fact ultimately occurred), a new legislature
chosen by fresh elections or, if necessary, no legislature, leaving
legislative power to be exercised by the N.P.C. or perhaps by the
S.A.R.'s Chief Executive or the P.C.85 The choice was a matter of
sovereign policy and prudential calculation.
Moreover, pro-P.R.C. parties in Hong Kong could field candi-
dates to contest the very elections that the P.R.C. held were ille-
gitimate and vowed would have no post-1997 effect.86 Addi-
tionally, pro-P.R.C. politicians in the territory argued for retaining
some elements of the through train, and cautioned Beijing against
precipitous moves to set up a "second stove" -a shadow govern-
ment well in advance of 1997-in reaction to the Patten reforms.
87
Rights is just an ordinary law .... under the common law system [where] new
legislation should be taken into account by all others which were introduced ear-
lier."); Tung Chee-hwa Clarifies Seven Points in Misunderstanding, Stressed Hong Kong
S.A.R. Will Make Laws on its Own, TA KuNG PAO, Feb. 6, 1997, at A12 (stating that
only sections 2(3), 3 and 4 of the Bill of Rights needed to be removed, and the rest
of the Bill and substantial portions of the amended Public Order and Societies Or-
dinances could be retained).
85 The N.P.C.'s initial acceptance, and ultimate rejection, of the through train
model suggest the range of options acceptable at one time or another to P.R.C. au-
thorities. With the through train derailed, the territory's leading pro-P.R.C. party
saw the conceivable recipients of lawmaking authority over Hong Kong on July 1,
1997 as including a provisional legislature, the Chief Executive, the P.C. (to be es-
tablished in 1996), or the N.P.C. or its Standing Committee. See Louise do Rosario,
Hollow House, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 24, 1994, at 27; Nomination of Provisional Leg-
islature Candidates Formally Starts, supra note 50, at A2; see also David Chu, Fact and
Fiction in the New Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 14, 1996 (suggesting
that post-July 1st elections were impractical, given the legislative vacuum prob-
lem, and that pre-July 1st elections for a new legislature raised a mixture of prac-
tical and constitutional problems).
86 Some sources also pointed to differences within the P.R.C. government
about how to react to the Patten reforms and related issues. See Tai Ming Cheung,
Changing Signals, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 4, 1993, at 13. See also Louise do Rosario,
Board Games, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 8, 1994, at 19 (noting the pro-China parties'
participation in the elections, and pro-China newspaper Wen Wei Po's endorse-
ment of elections).
87 See Louise do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 28,
1995, at 17 (stating that D.A.B. calls for members of the Provisional Legislature to
be elected, with members of 1995-elected Legco automatically among the candi-
dates); Bruce Gilley, Old Game, New Strategy, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 23, 1996, at 32
(pro-China business leader David Chu's pledge to press China to declare Martin
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Boycotting the elections and establishing pre-1997 institutions to
rival or partially displace the colonial government were doubtless
within China's positivist sovereign authority, as such politicians
conceived it. But that did not necessarily make such moves obliga-
tory or wise.
In the same vein, some of the specific restrictions on the Court
of Final Appeal's jurisdiction and the particular ceiling on its for-
eign membership were explained primarily as the P.R.C.'s policy
choices and not as the necessary implications of Chinese sovereign-
ty over Hong Kong.88 Lu Ping's view that the four-to-one ratio
could permit zero to four foreign judges certainly implied consid-
erable indeterminacy (and at least feigned flexibility) on a key
point. As the P.R.C.'s support for both the 1991 and 1995 C.F.A.
bills indicated, there was also a good deal of political flexibility in
the P.R.C.'s perspective about when the S.A.R.'s high court prop-
erly could be established. The P.R.C.'s raising, and then dropping,
the possibility of creating a body superior to the C.F.A., and subor-
dinate to the N.P.C., to review C.F.A. decisions suggests further
indeterminacy in the P.R.C.'s notion of an acceptable and permis-
sible structure for S.A.R. judicial institutions.
The kind of indeterminacy that produced such variety had al-
ways been present, but not previously so relevant, in the P.R.C.
and pro-P.R.C. side's sovereign discretion-protecting, positivist vi-
sion.89 What was different about the endgame was the character of
the issues at stake. The choices that the P.R.C. and its future Hong
Kong subordinates faced during this period were ones of policy
preference and instrumental calculation. With the focus thus
shifted, the values that key Hong Kong communities hold or might
be persuaded to hold also began to matter a great deal. How much
Lee eligible for the Provisional Legislature); Tai Ming Cheung, Frontal Assault, FAR
E. ECON. REV., Apr. 1, 1993, at 11 (quoting Tsang Yok-sing of the Democratic Alli-
ance for the Betterment of Hong Kong concerning the "second stove" option).
88 See generally Text of Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal
Agreement, supra note 65, at A2. Also notable in this regard is China's having
pushed for, and then dropped, a provision to establish a "post verdict remedial
mechanism" that threatened to undermine the finality of the C.F.A.'s decisions
and thus its credibility as the principal organ of a "high degree of judicial auton-
omy" for Hong Kong.
89 Protecting sovereign discretion was also the point of the constraints the
positivist perspective imposed on the sovereign- prohibitions on alienating or
destroying the sovereign's discretionary authority and requirements that the sov-
ereign act through procedural mechanisms that were as much empowering as
they were constraining.
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could or should the P.R.C. accommodate Hong Kong groups' pos-
sibly unpalatable views concerning what future laws and institu-
tions should look like, and what an adequate "rule of law" should
require? How much could the P.R.C. and its allies in the territory
hope to change those views and reduce the need for prudential ac-
commodation or, in the event of vastly divergent views, close the
gap to a point where accommodation might be possible?
For the British colonial authorities and Hong Kong's "liberal"
or "pro-democracy" elements, the endgame has had a similar ef-
fect. From the broadly naturalist perspective that they share, the
principle that the laws and institutions of the S.A.R. should meet
the standards of a just and good order did not dictate precisely
what all of those laws and institutions should look like. In other
words, it did not generate unique answers to many of the ques-
tions at issue in transitional Hong Kong's endgame.
Again, publicly expressed differences within the loosely knit
camp illustrate the scope for diversity, or at least claims of diver-
sity, within the vision. For example, the shared notion that Hong
Kong's government must be publicly accountable and sufficiently
democratic meant different things to different people when it came
to specific questions about the territory's transitional legislature.
Although substantially bolder than his predecessors, Governor
Patten painted a relatively modest vision of what was required.
What was necessary was a government that represented the will of
the Hong Kong people, "accountable to a broadly based legisla-
ture," providing both "sufficient democracy to help secure Hong
Kong's way of life" and "laws democratically enacted and rooted
in the community." 90 That goal could be meaningfully advanced
by electoral reforms that, by Patten's own account, were far from
radical.91
Legco members, Martin Lee and Emily Lau and others among
the territory's more ardent democrats, in contrast, insisted that
Hong Kong needed an indigenous democratic legislature, prefera-
bly one with universal suffrage for all seats.92 As Lee saw it, a sub-
90 Interview: Chris Patten, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 22.
91 See Question of Honour, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 1, 1993, at 12 (quoting
Patten, "I freely confess that my proposals are not a great step forward towards
democracy for Hong Kong. They aren't even a small step.").
92 See Louise do Rosario, Patten's Progress, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 14, 1994, at
21 (describing Emily Lau's proposal, one that came close to winning a majority in
Legco, calling for universal suffrage for all seats in the 1995 Legco elections); Lee,
Tide of Democracy, supra note 57, at 31 (criticizing Patten reforms for making only
one-third of Legco seats subject to direct elections).
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stantially democratized Legco with a greater role in government
was necessary to provide a replacement for the vicarious democ-
ratic accountability that the British Parliament had been provid-
ing.93 Under the colonial regime, a lack of local legislative democ-
racy was perhaps acceptable. Absent such true democratic
oversight after 1997, government accountability and legality were,
on this view, at risk.
A similar dynamic characterized the debate over the Court of
Final Appeal. The colonial government defended the C.F.A. bills
as creating an arrangement that would preserve the rule of law and
guarantee adequate judicial independence. 94 In contrast, leading
democratic politicians denounced the arrangement as a betrayal of
the same core substantive values, insisting that a viably independ-
ent court that protects the rule of law could not be so constrained
in its membership and jurisdiction.95 Even within the narrower
group of "pro-democracy" Hong Kong politicians, there was sub-
stantial division over whether the statutory provisions precluding
review of "acts of state" posed a serious threat to law-governed
and judicially accountable government.96
Finally, shared notions that justice demanded accountable and
law-governed government also seemed to produce no unanimity
with respect to the selection of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive.
93 See Tai Ming Cheung, Advance to the Rear, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 18, 1993,
at 11 (describing the concern of pro-democracy Legco members Martin Lee and
Christine Loh that negotiations for compromise between Patten proposals and
Chinese demands could be a "sell-out" of democracy for Hong Kong); Lee, supra
note 23, at 11 (making the argument about Parliament).
94 On British enthusiasm for the 1991 package that received unenthusiastic
responses from the Hong Kong Bar, see Stacy Mosher, Local Justice, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Oct. 10, 1991, at 12. With regard to the 1995 bill, it is, of course, possible that
the argument in favor of the bill was disingenuous, a face-saving effort by a colo-
nial government that knew it had failed. If so, it is still telling that the British au-
thorities made the argument. It suggests that they thought it at least sounded
plausible. And it stands in contrast to more uncompromising stances they took
toward China regarding issues on which the colonial authorities' position was
equally unlikely to prevail (including several controversies over the legislature).
95 See Martin Lee, The Courtship of Mr. Hoare, FARE. ECON. REV., July 27, 1995,
at 4 (Democratic Party leader and Legco member's charging that the colonial gov-
ernment-supported C.F.A. bill achieved a court that China would accept "at the
cost of the rule of law itself after 1997"); Louise do Rosario, Down But Not Out, FAR
E. ECON. REV., July 27, 1995, at 27 (describing Democratic Party and Legco member
Cheung Man-kwong's denunciation of the C.F.A. bill as Patten's "burying the
common-law system").
96 See Louise do Rosario, Future Imperfect, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 10, 1995, at
27 (citing the views of Martin Lee and legal academic Raymond Wacks).
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Many of Hong Kong's most prominent and partisan politicians at-
tacked the P.R.C.'s manipulation and control of the selection proc-
ess, impugning the claim to authority of an official chosen by
methods that in practice departed so far from minimally demo-
cratic bases. As Tung's statements on rolling back legal reforms
amply demonstrated to such critics, Tung was likely to be a puppet
of the Beijing authorities who had controlled the selection process
(and who had engineered a bail-out of Tung's troubled shipping
firm in the 1980s).97 The colonial government, in contrast, saw no
such fundamental principles at stake. Having initially refused ex-
ecutive branch contact with the P.R.C.'s ad hoc Preliminary Work-
ing Committee and having rejected out of hand cooperation with
the Provisional Legislature, the Governor and his administration
moved to cooperate closely with a Chief Executive-designate
whose appointment was no more beyond Hong Kong's control
than the selection of colonial governors had been, and whose suc-
cessors, the Basic Law promised, were to be chosen by properly
democratic methods.98 As the British authorities saw it, working
with the incoming executive to assure a well-prepared new ad-
ministration and a smooth transition was precisely the sort of col-
laboration that the Joint Declaration contemplated and that norms
of responsible government demanded.
Such room for differing interpretations of what, precisely, the
principled norms of sovereign obligation required in practice was
newly salient, but not new, in the broadly naturalist and liberal-
democratic vision embraced by the diverse band of the P.R.C.'s an-
tagonists in the struggle to shape Hong Kong's future order. In the
context of the endgame, the key questions had become the intra-
murally debatable ones about what presumably fixed and true
general principles required in the particular, complex, and chang-
ing circumstances of Hong Kong on the eve of reversion. And the
values major groups in Hong Kong already embraced or might be
convinced to adopt were an important part of those circumstances.
97 See, e.g., C.K. Lau, A Question of Trust, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12,
1996, at 21; Emily Lau, Tung Must Be Able to Act with Autonomy, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 6, 1997, at 18; Peter Humphrey, HK's Next Leader Called China Yes-Man,
Reuters, BC Cycle, Dec. 10, 1996 (quoting Legco member Martin Lee), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Tan Ee Lyn, HK Democrat Emily Lau Dragged
Away, 29 Arrested, Reuters, Dec. 11, 1996, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File.
98 See Bruce Gilley, Facing Up to Reality, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 9, 1996, at 16;
Chris Yeung, Tung Fails to Win over Governor, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 24,
1996, at 1; Policy Address of Governor Patten, supra note 56, at 4.
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Most obviously, lawmaking and law-interpreting institutions that
represented the will and values of Hong Kong's residents and that
were accountable to the territory's citizenry might look rather dif-
ferent if Hong Kongers embraced, for example, values supportive
of the Democratic Party's agenda rather than values in step with
the colonial government's positions, much less those espoused by
Hong Kong's pro-P.R.C. parties.
4.2. Hong Kong Politics
In addition to the emergence of the inherent indeterminacy of
broad visions of domestic law and sovereignty, more immediately
practical features of the endgame also pressed participants in the
political wrangling over Hong Kong to pay more attention to the
values Hong Kong citizens hold or might hold. For reasons at
most loosely related to differences between the principal political
participants' broad conceptions of law and sovereign authority, the
issues and conflicts that dominated Hong Kong's last years as a
colony often involved the territory's residents more directly than
they had been in earlier phases.
The Joint Declaration had dealt with abstract questions of sov-
ereignty and sketchy representations of a legal and constitutional
order that would not be fully implemented until nearly fifteen
years later. Moreover, Hong Kong had been excluded from nego-
tiations that, the P.R.C. insisted, could be conducted only between
the two sovereigns with interests in the territory. The Basic Law,
to be sure, addressed issues that were of increasingly immediate
concern in the territory, and did so through a process that involved
Hong Kongers. After all, the Basic Law established a framework
for Hong Kong's post-reversion domestic laws and government in-
stitutions, and did so in part through a Basic Law Drafting Com-
mittee and a Basic Law Consultative Committee that included
Hong Kong citizens. Nonetheless, the Basic Law remained a rela-
tively skeletal document that provided a constitution for a political
entity that would not come into being for almost a decade. And,
formally (and certainly in practice), it was a P.R.C. document, its
provisions securely beyond Hong Kong's power to change and, in
some respects, even to interpret.
During the 1990s, however, the key controversies concerned
the specific characteristics of the laws and institutions under which
Hong Kongers would have to live and work in the near term. The
process of addressing those issues and conflicts involved consider-
1506 [Vol. 25:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/6
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME
able numbers of Hong Kong residents as constituents for an in-
creasingly democratic Legco membership that was given an oppor-
tunity to weigh in on colonial legislation to amend relevant laws or
structure key institutions, as members of the ever larger and more
influential advisory, preparatory and nominating bodies that the
P.R.C. established to help manage the transition, or as participants
in the mass street demonstrations that became a staple of Hong
Kong politics after the Chinese authorities crushed the Democracy
Movement on the mainland in 1989. In this context, it became per-
ilous, and perhaps impossible, to slight the attitudes that people in
Hong Kong held, or might come to hold, toward "rule of law"
questions in general and in relation to the laws and institutions
that were the focus of the period's politics.
In addition, two major political events made such actual or po-
tential values in Hong Kong still more pressing concerns for the
political elites, of whatever stripe, who were working to shape the
details of the S.A.R.'s key laws and core government institutions.
First, in 1989, the pro-democracy protests at Tiananmen Square
electrified Hong Kong, prompting mass rallies in the territory to
support the movement and supportive comments from some of the
territory's leading tycoons.99 The violent suppression of the pro-
tests in China triggered shock, additional mass demonstrations and
growing public pressure in Hong Kong to take steps, through local
legislation and in the on-going discussions with the P.R.C. over the
territory's future laws and institutions, to reduce the risk that
Hong Kong would face an equally repressive, and seemingly law-
less, future under Chinese rule.
These events brought sustained higher levels of political en-
gagement and mobilization in the territory. The immediate conse-
quence was broader and more ardent public support for the liberal,
legalist and democratizing agenda that some of the territory's
emergent political leaders and, to a lesser degree, the colonial au-
thorities were advocating. Indirectly, the disorder that mass pro-
tests seemed to portend, and the adverse economic consequences
that a likely harsh P.R.C. reaction to such activities surely would
threaten, prompted reactions in some more conservative or previ-
ously apolitical circles. The concern manifested in those quarters
suggested potential support for a very different approach to the le-
gal and institutional issues of the endgame, one more in keeping
with the P.R.C.'s notion of a tolerable legal and institutional order.
99 See, e.g., Lau, Voice of the People, supra note 41, at 18.
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Second, in 1992, the installation of Christopher Patten as Hong
Kong's last colonial governor brought a greatly increased com-
mitment by the Hong Kong government to expand the role of the
territory's residents in the territory's government. Patten's reforms
accelerated a previously creeping process of democratizing the
electoral process for Legco and other bodies, and he accorded the
increasingly democratic Legco a greater voice in the vital legal and
policy debates of the era. Drawing on experience in electoral poli-
tics that his predecessors had lacked, Patten also introduced a bit of
British-style campaign politics to his own dealings with the citi-
zenry, seeking to measure their mood and rally their support in a
way, and to an extent, that no prior colonial governor had.100
As with Tiananmen, the direct effect here also was to bring
forth constituencies supportive of the liberal or pro-democracy
agenda and its underlying vision of sovereignty and the rule of
law. The democratic parties and pro-democracy independents
were the big winners in the elections held under the expanded
franchise and became the most prominent voices in Legco. And
Patten's message, sometimes rousing and sometimes temperate,
was consistently rooted in a liberal and naturalist conception of
how the issues of the endgame should be addressed. Here too,
however, the indirect effect was also to make more politically rele-
vant Hong Kong groups that were committed, or at least open, to
very different perspectives and values. Pro-P.R.C. and conserva-
tive business interests formed parties, both to contest the elections
and more generally to increase their effectiveness in the newly par-
tisan and mass-oriented politics that the reforms had introduced.
On both sides, it had become necessary to worry about how pro-
posed answers to the legal and institutional questions dominating
the era played, or might be made to play, with key elements in an
expanded world of Hong Kong politics.
4.3. Battling over "the People" and the Business Community: A
Synopsis of Strategies
Britain, the colonial government, Hong Kong's liberal and de-
mocratic political leaders, the P.R.C., and its agents and allies in the
territory have responded to the broadening scope of Hong Kong
politics, and its shift in focus to concrete questions that immedi-
ately concern Hong Kongers and that do not have determinate an-
100 For a brief description of Patten's political background, see James Bar-
tholomew & Stacy Mosher, Last Viceroy, FAR E. EcoN. REV., May 7, 1992, at 15.
1508 [Vol. 25:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/6
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME
swers under the visions of law and sovereignty long embraced by
the two major political camps. On both sides, this response has in-
cluded complex and shifting strategies to find and to build sup-
port - or at least acquiescence - among key segments of Hong
Kong society for general positions on rule-of-law values and spe-
cific solutions to the legal and institutional issues of the era. While
these strategies have targeted a number of groups (including, for
example, Hong Kong's civil servants), the primary addressees have
been "the people of Hong Kong" and the business community.
Although clearly explicable in terms of recent changes in Hong
Kong politics and the pressures of the reversion date's approach,
the focus on "the people" in the battle over the territory's political
and legal future is ironic and slightly odd. Long excluded from
Hong Kong politics and accorded an inferior status under its laws,
they have finally become a central concern, but only in the context
of a political conflict that ignores their considerable diversity. In
addressing "the people" (implicitly limited to the middle and
lower economic classes of the overwhelmingly ethnic Chinese
population), both sides in the political struggle have ignored vast
differences in wealth, education, rootedness in Hong Kong, and
even ideological orientation among their target group. They have
addressed an undifferentiated "people of Hong Kong" with strate-
gies that mix appeals to principle, inclination, and interest.
The "liberal" or "democratic" argument to, and about, "the
people" has claimed that the interests and preferences of the terri-
tory's ordinary citizens demand the preservation of the values em-
bodied in Hong Kong's late colonial rule-of-law system, including
its institutions of government accountability. According to the
more sweeping version of this argument pressed by some pro-
democracy politicians, the people also require the liberalizing and
democratizing reforms of recent years, and perhaps more. Assert-
ing that the people strongly embrace such norms and views, the
colonial authorities and the territory's most popular politicians
have made descriptive claims about mass public attitudes. At the
same time, they have also sought to persuade a "people" whom
they at times admitted was not yet ardently enough committed to
the liberal and democratic agenda, especially in its more radically
reformist versions.
Such claims about popular normative orientations, and such ef-
forts to cultivate them, have coexisted with more direct appeals to
"the people's" immediate and material interests. Rolling back the
Bill of Rights and civil liberties legislation and dismantling the
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elected legislature would not only fly in the face of popular prefer-
ence; it would also harm the territory's stability and prosperity, ei-
ther by unravelling the rule of law upon which Hong Kong's suc-
cess depended, or by so angering "the people" (and foreign
investors as well) that they would forcefully reject such moves,
with disastrous consequences for stability and prosperity. Many of
Hong Kong's liberal politicians, but not the colonial government,
have argued to the people that similar risks flow from the Court of
Final Appeal deal and the undemocratic selection of the Chief Ex-
ecutive.
The P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. camp's approach to "the Hong Kong
people" has included a similarly mixed focus on values and inter-
ests, but with clearly different content. Accepting that the rule of
law is subjectively and objectively important to the territory's citi-
zenry, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong supporters have argued that
what the people need and want is a rule of law that does not so
slavishly follow the colonial inheritance or embrace radical and po-
tentially dangerous reforms. Seeking to tap the pride that ordinary
Hong Kongers feel in the territory's remarkable accomplishments
and the considerable nationalist sentiments that underlie popular
ambivalence about colonial rule, such arguments have asserted
that the Hong Kong people do, should, or must recognize that their
own special (and distinctly Chinese) qualities and values are
largely responsible for Hong Kong's success, and that a less fully
liberal or Western-style rule of law is what they want and need.
At the same time, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies have ar-
gued to the people that accepting the Chinese position on the terri-
tory's future rule-of-law regime and on specific legal and institu-
tional issues is a matter of pragmatism as well as principle or
preexisting preference. That has been one of the points of the ar-
guments asserting that the British-style rule-of-law has contributed
relatively little to Hong Kong's remarkable stability and prosper-
ity, and that Hong Kong's past successes have been achieved de-
spite the absence of the liberal and democratic structures that the
colonial authorities and their sometime allies in Legco were trying
to instill on the eve of reversion. The P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. side
has cautioned that failure to roll back the government-weakening
reforms to civil liberties laws, exclude "subversives" from the ini-
tial legislature, or restrict judicial power to overturn government
decisions would produce social and political instability in Hong
Kong that would be harmful to the preferences and interests of the
people. Moreover, Chinese and pro-P.R.C. sources have warned
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that accepting the line peddled by the territory's "pro-democracy"
politicians or its colonial governor would surely bring conflict and
problems in S.A.R.-mainland relations. On this view, it simply
would not be good for the people of Hong Kong to have a legisla-
ture full of people who could not communicate effectively with the
P.R.C., a Chief Executive whose authority was under incessant at-
tack locally, and a set of laws conducive to activities inimical to
Chinese sovereignty.
That the principal parties to the ongoing battle over the terri-
tory's future laws and institutions also would focus on the business
community is not surprising, given that group's obvious impor-
tance in maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity, and the attention
that the colonial government and the P.R.C. leadership have long
lavished on business elites and their interests when making poli-
cies concerning the territory. Yet, here too, the endgame has
brought a more strikingly political battle in which the target group
has been addressed as a relatively uniform whole, with little regard
for differences between venerable trading houses and fast-rising
entrepreneurs, ethnic Chinese tycoons and foreign-based multina-
tional corporations, enterprises dependent on Hong Kong revenues
and conglomerates with extensive investments in the mainland.
Both sides have addressed and sought to convince "business" with
strategies parallelling those they have used with respect to "the
people."
Prominent Hong Kong politicians and senior colonial govern-
ment officials have asserted that members of the business commu-
nity do, or should, accept a broadly liberal and democratic version
of rule-of-law values and concomitant positions on the legal and
institutional questions of the day. Business already knows, or
must soon recognize, that it requires strong legal protection of civil
liberties, a publicly (and, as some Hong Kong politicians see it,
fully democratically) accountable legislature (and executive) to en-
act and oversee laws, and an independent judiciary with broad ju-
risdiction to review burdensome government action and to enforce
contracts even against well-connected or state-owned Chinese
firms. On the liberal or pro-democracy view, these things are
goods that business owes it to Hong Kong to support, that are es-
sential to the lifestyle many business elites want, and that provide
necessary support for Hong Kong's thriving economy.
Such arguments, of course, shade into straight-forward appeals
to business leaders' presumed self-interest. The more "pragmatic"
line of argument also has included dire warnings about the eco-
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nomic consequences of acquiescing in the legal and institutional
regime (and its underlying "thin" theory of legality and sovereign-
ty) that the P.R.C. prefers.
In response, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies have argued
that Hong Kong's business elites do, or at least should, reject much
of the liberal agenda as politically destabilizing and economically
enervating, and demand nothing from S.A.R. laws and institutions
beyond what the P.R.C. has assured them it will provide. Business
should and would welcome, the pro-P.R.C. line of argument has
continued, a legislature not dominated by radical democrats, a
chief executive who shares their concerns and values, and civil lib-
erties and economic laws conducive to social order and Hong
Kong's established, and often informal, ways of doing business.
Further, sources on the P.R.C. side have made it clear that
business support for the positions urged by the territory's liberal
politicians, and sometimes by its colonial rulers, would make it
more likely that major questions concerning the reception of prior
laws, the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive would remain
unsettled up to the reversion date and perhaps beyond. Such "un-
certainty" and the prospects of a judicial or legislative "vacuum"
are, the P.R.C. and its supporters have repeatedly reminded their
business audience, contrary to the preferences and interests of the
business community. Appealing still more crassly to the self-
interest of business elites, the P.R.C. has sometimes signalled that
those in the business community who backed Patten's or the De-
mocrats' agenda faced possible economic retribution.0 1
This brief sketch of the strategies for claiming and cultivating
support among key groups in Hong Kong adds a final piece to the
mosaic of political struggles over legal and institutional questions
in transitional Hong Kong's endgame. Naked, cynical, even thug-
gish appeals to the self-interest of "the people" or "business" coex-
ist with more principled arguments - some asserting or urging pre-
ferred rule-of-law values and compatible legal and institutional
commitments among the target social groups, and others insisting
that proposed solutions to the controversies of the period are, or
are not, legitimate in terms of fundamental principles of sover-
eignty and domestic law. As we have seen, the last of these types
101 For a more extensive discussion of the conflict over the business commu-
nity, see Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Cooking the Rice Without Cooking the
Goose: The Rule of Law, the Battle Over Business, and the Quest for Prosperity in Hong
Kong After 1997, in HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE: THE ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REVERSION (Warren I. Cohen & Li Zhao eds., 1997).
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of argument has also characterized a conflict among political play-
ers that has not explicitly focused on the people or the business
community. As this overlapping of "principled" arguments sug-
gests, battles over the concrete implications of basic principles of
law and sovereignty and battles for the allegiance of key Hong
Kong constituencies are bound together in the broader picture of
the conflict over Hong Kong's future legal and institutional order.
The boundaries between the "purely political-legal" struggle and
the battle for "social support" are, of course, illusory. Business el-
ites and ordinary citizens have been among the known, and often
intended, audiences of ideological debates nominally not ad-
dressed to them. At the same time, the principal political players
have been addressing one another as much as any popular or busi-
ness audience when they have argued about socially immanent
rule-of-law values and the interests and preferences of social
groups.
This Article has explored the first of these two battles and the
broad political and ideological context of both. In doing so, it has
explained how the persistence, even the sharpening, of an ideo-
logical clash of visions can be consistent with two developments
among adherents to the polarized visions of law and sovereignty:
first, a growing flexibility and intramural disagreement over spe-
cific laws and concrete governmental institutions, and, second, an
increasing attention to socially held rule-of-law values and opin-
ions on the issues of the day.
The account of Hong Kong's endgame, however, remains in-
complete. It does not yet fully address the significance of the par-
ticular strategies the main parties to the political struggles used in
addressing and pursuing key social groups. Integrating that part
of the story fully into the analysis must await a more detailed in-
quiry into the political battles over "the Hong Kong people" and
"the business community," a project we take up in Hong Kong's
Endgame and the Rule of Law (II). Still, at this point, enough of the
picture is visible to suggest how the notion of a pre-1997 "end-
game" can provide an analytic link between that struggle over so-
cial groups and the matters examined in more depth in this Article.
5. STRATEGIES FOR HONG KONG'S "ENDGAME"
Three concepts of an "endgame" suggest coherent ways of un-
derstanding this seemingly arbitrary or paradoxical combination of
approaches to the legal and institutional issues that have domi-
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nated the politics of Hong Kong's last pre-reversion years.
5.1. "Colloquial" Endgames
This period might be thought of as an endgame in the collo-
quial sense, as typically used in journalistic accounts of legislative
or broader political negotiations over controversial issues. The
players realize that they face, in effect, a deadline before which
they must complete all deals. Where they perceive feasible deals
that are superior to the alternative of leaving matters unresolved,
the players will scramble to mobilize forces conducive to the
agreements they prefer and will try to craft bargaining strategies
that avoid both too-ready compromises (leading to less favorable
deals than might have been achieved) and excessive "holding-out"
(leading to a failure to reach deals that were worth having). The
"colloquial endgame" analysis assumes, at least implicitly, a
mechanism for deterring parties from reneging on such eleventh-
hour deals, with costs to reputation, or judicial or political en-
forcement being among the more obvious and common examples.
For Hong Kong, July 1, 1997 is, of course, the deadline for reso-
lution of such issues as rights-protecting legislation, the legislature,
the highest court, and the selection of the highest executive officer
for the S.A.R. Unlike the fact of Hong Kong's reversion or the exis-
tence and basic structure of the S.A.R. (which had been hashed out
in the 1980s), none of these matters was firmly settled well in ad-
vance of 1997, leaving them all potentially subject to the dynamics
of an endgame in the colloquial sense.
Other essential aspects of an endgame, in this sense, were pre-
sent as well. The key political participants who might bargain with
respect to these issues quite plausibly perceived possible outcomes
that were superior to a "no deal" option. For the colonial authori-
ties and the territory's liberal and democratic politicians, a number
of conceivable resolutions doubtless seemed better than letting the
P.R.C. and the S.A.R. government address them entirely on their
own after 1997. Indeed, the P.R.C. and its allies frequently used
just that argument, raising the specter of uncertainty and poten-
tially unpalatable results that would attend a failure to reach
agreement, to press their negotiating partners and Hong Kong au-
diences to accept otherwise unappealing proposals.
For the P.R.C. and its allies too, the "no deal" option was surely
less appealing than some of the very favorable arrangements in
which the P.R.C. could reasonably expect the colonial authorities
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and many Hong Kong politicians to acquiesce. And, absent a deal,
a pre-announced, unilaterally imposed arrangement of the sort that
characterized the Provisional Legislature and Bill of Rights issues
was a plausible second-best solution, especially if some degree of
support in the territory could be obtained. As many in the P.R.C.
and pro-P.R.C. camp appeared to realize, a failure to reach an ac-
cord or to win acceptance of reasonably clear arrangements before
reversion, with attendant prospects of unspecified unilateral reso-
lution after July 1, 1997, could undermine the confidence in Hong
Kong's future that Beijing wanted to preserve.
As a "colloquial" endgame also requires, reneging on last-
minute promises after Hong Kong's reversion could plausibly trig-
ger sanctions that the same underlying behavior would not elicit in
the absence of such undertakings. These ranged from the highly
juridical if rather implausible (appeals to the International Court of
Justice to enforce relevant provisions of the Joint Declaration or to
Hong Kong courts or authorized P.R.C. bodies to enforce and ap-
ply relevant sections of the Basic Law or other laws) to the conven-
tionally political (reputational costs to the P.R.C. in Hong Kong
and globally, and the prospect of political unrest in Hong Kong, on
one side, and the costs to Hong Kong liberals' claims to the moral
and legal high-ground, and the prospect of a political crackdown
in Hong Kong, on the other).
Against this background, the battle over "the people" and "the
business community" looks like an endgame strategy in the collo-
quial sense. In appealing to and pressuring those groups, the par-
ticipants in a highly political process have been scrambling to mo-
bilize a "blitz" of whatever pressure they can bring to bear to make
sure that the deals that do get done at the last minute track as
closely as possible the participants' ideological preferences. That
both sides in the political struggle to shape Hong Kong's future
laws and institutions would intensify efforts and diversify their ar-
guments in trying to build and deploy such socially-based political
pressure during the 1990s is, then, hardly remarkable. That they
would turn to such strategies (and especially to "threats" and
"bribes" alongside appeals to principle) makes sense in the "now
or never" atmosphere of an endgame, in the colloquial sense.
The splits and shifts within the two blocks of political players
can fit this picture as well. The divisions that emerged between
Hong Kong's colonial authorities and the territory's pro-democra-
cy politicians on, for example, the Court of Final Appeal bill and
the Chief Executive selection process, and the variety of "pro-
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P.R.C." approaches to handling Bill of Rights-related questions and
the legislative through train, among other issues, reflect precisely
the sort of close tactical choices that the endgame poses. Where
does an unappealing proposed resolution cross the line and be-
come worse than a "no-deal" option? At what point does pressing
for a more appealing deal impose a risk of foregoing a resolution
worth having that is greater than its likely benefits in getting the
other side to compromise toward the prospective "hold-out's" pre-
ferred solution?
In a world of imperfect information, even those who share the
same ideological perspective or concrete goals may differ on such
questions. Indeed, such differences in tactical judgment seem to
echo loudly in the increasingly testy exchanges between the colo-
nial government and the territory's most ardent democrats during
the middle 1990s. Avowals of support for the same ends of gov-
ernment accountability and the rule of law coexisted with charges
from Hong Kong's democratic politicians that the British authori-
ties were duplicitous and had betrayed those goals, and responses
from colonial government officials that the democrats were being
unrealistic, provocative, and risked scuttling the best deals that one
could reasonably hope to achieve in pursuit of their shared values.
The same dynamic seems to be reflected, at least obliquely, in
the P.R.C. side's shifts between more and less accommodating
stances toward reforms of civil liberties laws, electoral laws and
other matters, and in the sometimes-public entreaties from pro-
P.R.C. Hong Kong sources (and perhaps even the Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office) to central leaders to take a softer line on the
legal and institutional issues of the era. At different times and to
different members of this less-than-monolithic block, endorsing
flawed but popular expansions of the franchise and acquiescing in
some questionable changes to public order legislation could seem
to offer a relatively costless path to avoiding a rocky transition and
to obtaining concessions on other fronts, or it could seem to declare
negotiable issues of sovereignty and control on which the P.R.C.
need not, or could not, yield.
5.2. "Technical" Endgames
The final years of the political struggle over Hong Kong's post-
reversion legal and institutional order also could be construed as
an endgame in the more technical sense, as the term is used in the
rational choice and game theory literature. That is, the players un-
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derstand that they are in the final round of their reiterative deal-
ings and are no longer deterred from "defecting" or "cheating" by
the prospect that such behavior will make their other pledges to
perform less credible to other players, and, in turn, make it more
difficult (that is, more costly) for the defecting party to make reli-
able, desirable deals later. In such a context, the impediments to
making any bargain escalate and the credibility of any bargains
nominally struck plummets.
For this concept to apply, the final iteration of bargaining over
Hong Kong's post-reversion future has to have been a long one,
with the shadow of July 1, 1997 extending back over much of the
1990s. Such a reading of the period is not farfetched.10 2 As we
have seen, both sides' discussions on many of the issues of the era,
most notably political and electoral reform and the establishment
of the Court of Final Appeal, assumed that the parties were already
in a final round of negotiations about the territory's future, with lit-
tle or no talk of trading off compromises on one legal or institu-
tional issue for gains on another, and few remarks about the need
to assure continuing cooperation among the parties to ensure a
smooth transition. Moreover, the major controversies of the period
unfolded simultaneously, with each having surfaced by the early
1990s and all still a subject of conflict and a source of uncertainty
during the waning months of colonial rule. Such patterns were a
marked departure from Sino-British negotiations during the 1980s
that had operated under the understanding that both sides should,
and would need to, cooperate in the run-up to 1997 and that the
Joint Declaration, Basic Law and lesser, subconstitutional matters
would be addressed sequentially.
At least if we focus narrowly on the immediate context of Hong
Kong, the notion that parties' incentives not to defect were low af-
ter the beginning of the 1990s is quite plausible. Already handing
over much de facto authority to the territory's future rulers, and
within a few years of the formal end of colonial rule, the United
Kingdom ("U.K.") arguably was already well on its way to not
even being present, much less "deterrable." Certain to be thrown
out of office, and expecting possibly crippling restrictions on their
political activities after 1997, liberal and democratic politicians in
Hong Kong also arguably faced few incentives to cooperate or
102 The factual issues about Hong Kong noted in the text aside, many elabora-
tions on the theory of reiterative games note that the prospect of a true endgame
can, in effect, "infect" earlier iterations of bargaining, thus spreading the patholo-
gies of the endgame back to preceding rounds.
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compromise and, accordingly, could make few credible promises
even if the P.R.C. proved willing to negotiate.
Certainly, many Chinese and pro-P.R.C. statements about the
colonial authorities and liberal politicians during the 1990s were
consistent with an endgame assumption about the poor possibili-
ties of bargaining. A colonial government painted as bent on uni-
lateral last-minute moves to weaken governmental authority, cre-
ate a hotbed for sedition, and damage fiscal health -all in violation
of prior understandings and agreements-was not the fit or credi-
ble bargaining partner with which the P.R.C. had earlier seen fit to
negotiate elements of a smooth transition. And the P.R.C.'s brand-
ing some of Legco's leading democrats as "subversives" suggested
that anything cooperative they said was no longer to be believed,
even though some of them had been included in earlier rounds of
bargaining, through appointment to the Basic Law Drafting Com-
mittee or membership in a legislature expected to ride the through
train.1 03
From the "liberal" or "pro-democracy" side's perspective, the
fact that Hong Kong soon would lose the "protection" of its colo-
nial status which (for all its flaws) had required the P.R.C. to deal
with Hong Kong at arm's length and through another sovereign
state, made any promises the P.R.C. might make not credible. On
this view, with Britain gone, local liberals silenced, and the world
likely not paying much attention, the P.R.C. would be free after the
endgame to rewrite any arrangements it disliked, much as it had in
two events that coincided with the beginning of Hong Kong's end-
game: the betrayal of domestic P.R.C. legality in the suppression of
the democracy movement at Tiananmen, and the departures from
the P.R.C.'s international legal promises of the Joint Declaration
that were effected through the Basic Law.
In such a context, the protracted debate and often-futile nego-
103 China's position on the "through train" was, of course, that the Legco
elected in 1995 was unacceptable. But some of the members of that body, includ-
ing Martin Lee, had also served on the 1991-selected Legco, which had clearly
been selected in a manner compatible with the degree of democratization permit-
ted under the through train model. And they, or others of their ilk, certainly
could have been expected to obtain seats on a 1995 Legco selected in conformity
with China's reading of the relevant legal framework. Indeed, several of the
Legco members most troubling to the P.R.C. represented some of the twenty geo-
graphical constituencies to which the P.R.C. and its allies made no objection in
their attack on the Patten reforms, and the universal suffrage election methods for
those seats were compatible with the legal conditions for the "through train" that
the P.R.C. had prescribed.
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tiations over the legal and institutional issues of the era are intelli-
gible in terms of a simple endgame in the technical sense. Most
simply, it is certainly plausible to conclude that no real deal was
reached, and few if any promises contrary to inclination were
made. The rules for the 1995 elections and the enactment of the Bill
of Rights and other legislative changes effective before 1997 were,
at base, the unilateral acts of the colonial authorities. The questions
of the Provisional Legislature, the Chief Executive, and the fate of
the Bill of Rights were settled just as unilaterally by the P.R.C. and
on the P.R.C.'s terms, subject only to whatever constraints pruden-
tial considerations suggested. An essentially "imposed" Court
deal to which the British acquiesced was little different. And many
participants and observers consider the limited promises that the
P.R.C. did make in each of these areas to be of less-than-certain ef-
ficacy after July 1, 1997.
The struggles over the people and the business community
similarly make sense as strategies for an endgame in the technical
sense. In seeking to energize or persuade the social groups who
hold the keys to Hong Kong's continued success, the principal par-
ticipants in the political process have been trying to create substi-
tutes for the agreements and promises that are impossible to reach
or impossible to take seriously. That is, they have been trying to
assure that Hong Kong's post-reversion political landscape will
constrain, or permit, the territory's future rulers to behave in ways
that track what their preferred political "deal" would have re-
quired. For both the "pro-P.R.C." side and the "liberal" or "de-
mocratic" side, finding or fabricating support in important Hong
Kong communities for preferred resolutions to the specific legal
and institutional questions of the era-and for compatible orienta-
tions toward the rule of law more generally-has become an im-
perative to be pursued by whatever means available, and often
quite apart from any process of negotiation between the key par-
ticipants in the more narrow political process.
The diversity and instability of social-group-targeting strate-
gies may fit the picture of a technical endgame as well. Ideological
purity and an intransigent insistence on preferred outcomes may
be, at worst, costless since they do not put at risk any worthwhile
deals that could be made and relied upon. Moreover, adopting
such a stance might seem more promising as a mechanism for cre-
ating the post-endgame social and political pressure on which suc-
cess in achieving preferred outcomes depends in the context of a
"technical" endgame. That is, presenting a simple and uncompro-
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mising version of one's own position, or that of one's opponents,
could be the most effective means to inspire, or frighten, the rele-
vant audience about what a future approximating a "liberal or de-
mocratic" agenda or a "pro-P.R.C." alternative might bring.
On the other hand, a more accommodating and moderate-
sounding perspective might seem less likely to alienate or to scare
off key communities who have tended to see their interests being
served reasonably well by continuity and stability. Such a tactic at
least would seem worth trying, for it could always be abandoned
simply by failing to honor promises that in retrospect appeared
unwise. Alternatively, a more flexible and compromising ap-
proach might make it possible to reach nominal resolutions that
would be worthwhile despite the problems of defection inherent in
an endgame. Even if neither side can do much to make a bargain
relatively invulnerable to reneging immediately after July 1, 1997,
the mere fact of a deal or a promise can create popular pressure
and elite expectations in Hong Kong that its terms be honored or
accepted. And to the extent that an agreement can be partially im-
plemented before the reversion, it can acquire a degree of tangible,
institutional momentum that is not lightly reversed despite the ab-
sence of an ongoing relationship between the parties and the lack
of the conventional non-endgame incentives not to defect from the
deal or promise per se.
Like the tactical questions of the "colloquial endgame," these
too are matters on which judgment might vary over time and
among adherents to the same normative perspective and support-
ers of the same general resolution of the legal and institutional is-
sues of the endgame. It is plausible to see reflections of the former
view in the approaches that the territory's most strident "liberal"
or "pro-democracy" politicians took, for example, in denouncing
the Court of Final Appeal accords as a betrayal of legality and de-
mocracy or in calling for democratization far more rapid than the
Patten plan contemplated. The same sort of assessment could ex-
plain some of the more "hard-line" positions in the pro-P.R.C.
side's perspective, such as out-of-hand dismissals of civil liberties
legislation as unacceptable and dangerous, and sweeping asser-
tions of the P.R.C. and S.A.R. governments' wide discretion in es-
tablishing laws and institutions for post-1997 Hong Kong. The lat-
ter view, in contrast, seems more in step with the methods adopted
by the colonial authorities in accepting the court deals (especially
the 1991 arrangement which might have permitted the C.F.A. to be
set up in 1993), and the Chief Executive selection process. It may
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also explain the decision to press only for a modest degree of de-
mocratization for the 1995 elections, under a set of rules that could
be defended as compatible with the P.R.C.-established conditions
for a through train and that, once in place, could be expected to
command broad popular support. The same perspective may also
help to make sense of the more moderate aspects of the arguments
pursued by the P.R.C. and its allies in the territory, including those
that pledged substantial continuity in some civil liberties-
protecting laws and a system permitting a considerable degree of
electoral democracy. Sometimes quite explicitly, proponents of
such positions presented them as prudent, perhaps shrewdly pre-
emptive, tactics for dealing with Hong Kong preferences that
would surely persist beyond reversion and have to be addressed
then.
5.3. The End of the Game, Not the End of the Games
Finally, pre-reversion Hong Kong's endgame can be analyzed
as the end of "a game," but not the end of a series of "games" for
key participants in the political struggle to shape the territory's
laws and institutions. That is, when the "game" - the particular set
of related, reiterative interactions among a stable set of players -
comes to an end, the players do not disappear from one another's
worlds. They may continue to interact but in a new "game" where
they may play different roles, under different rules, and with dif-
ferent assets. In such a context, the players approaching the end of
the initial game may face extremely complex choices, with, for ex-
ample, the low costs of "defecting" being much less certain than in
a true endgame in the technical sense, and the demarcation be-
tween "pre-deadline" and "post-deadline" deals being much less
sharp than in a true endgame in the colloquial sense.
Although not as analytically crisp, this conception has empiri-
cal appeal. In Hong Kong, most of the major participants are likely
to remain in the picture beyond 1997, but on very different terms.
The P.R.C. will become a more dominant force in Hong Kong once
Britain has withdrawn, the colonial government has been abol-
ished, and the current Legco has been dissolved. Although, at last,
the territory's effective sovereign, the P.R.C. is not likely to be the
only player in what promises to be an ongoing process of shaping
S.A.R. laws and institutions. A local government and pro-P.R.C.
organizations are not likely suddenly to become completely indis-
tinguishable from the central Chinese authorities in a Chinese state
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that seems ever more fragmented. Also, it is by no means certain
that the leading democrats and like-minded independents will be
permanently silenced or marginalized. In addition, some people
with broadly liberal and legalist sympathies hold some of the most
important posts in the through-train-riding executive branch.
Even the U.K. leadership has insisted that its obligations to Hong
Kong extend beyond 1997 and that it will continue to exert what-
ever international pressure it can to enforce the agreements and
principles that it believes apply.
From this perspective, the political battles over "business" and
"the people" are in part about pressuring participants in the politi-
cal process to make favorable deals before the July 1, 1997 dead-
line, and in part about building constituencies to press for desired
solutions in the absence of any effective pre-reversion deal. But
they are also about cultivating and accumulating assets for the next
"game." Much of what both sides have done in the political strug-
gle over social groups seems to make sense on these terms. Such
an account, for example, suggests that it was coherent and rational
for some of Hong Kong's most prominent democrats to continue to
campaign for popular and business support for their positions on
rule-of-law issues despite a belief that no meaningful deal with the
P.R.C. was possible in advance of the 1997 deadline, and despite
pessimism about the likelihood of business leaders or the people
pressing the liberal agenda immediately after reversion. Con-
versely, the pursuit of the same sort of asset-cultivation strategy
could provide one explanation of the P.R.C.'s sometimes provoca-
tive and sometimes embarrassingly unsuccessful attempts to foster
pro-P.R.C. views and build a cadre of pro-P.R.C. organs and loyal-
ists, both among the masses and among the territory's business el-
ites, even though such groups seemed relatively ineffectual before
the handback, and arguably superfluous afterwards.
A notion of an ending game, but with continuing games, also
provides another way of making sense of the major political par-
ticipants' interactions on the eve of reversion. For example, if re-
putational concerns matter more than in a pure endgame in the
technical sense and making a deal matters less than in a pure end-
game in the colloquial sense, then the P.R.C. and its allies were un-
derstandably willing to press for resolutions of major legal and in-
stitutional issues before July 1, but remained reluctant to strike
deals or make promises that were relatively unpalatable. Not
wanting to bear the costs to credibility and confidence that a failure
to perform would bring and reasonably confident that adequate
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and affordable resolutions might still be crafted after reversion, the
P.R.C. was understandably willing to be fairly, but not completely,
intransigent. Similarly, Hong Kong's pro-democracy leaders and
activists, on this view, had perhaps equally comprehensible rea-
sons to seek genuine solutions on key issues, but not to compro-
mise very much: analogous reputational concerns (absent from the
simplest version of the true technical endgame) dissuaded them
from imperiling, through compromise or defection, the claim to the
moral high ground that was perhaps their principal reversion-
surviving asset; so too did a plausible belief (less tenable in the true
colloquial endgame) that they might be able, despite their initially
weakened condition, ultimately to negotiate post-reversion resolu-
tions of key legal and institutional issues that were preferable to
what the P.R.C. was offering at the endgame. Perhaps tellingly,
this notion of an endgame within an on-going and changing series
of games works least well in explaining the behavior of the British
authorities, the one heretofore principal participant who would not
play a major role in post-1997 "games."
All three of these notions of an endgame fit the evidence from
contemporary Hong Kong reasonably well; none fits perfectly.
Each may well capture some facets of a reality too complex to be
reduced to a single model. On the eve of July 1, 1997 choosing
among them, or rejecting all three, is at best a speculative enter-
prise. For now, at least, their utility likely lies in the light they col-
lectively shed on contemporary Hong Kong's patterns of purity
and pragmatism: they provide frameworks for understanding how
the clash between principled but partially indeterminate visions of
domestic law and sovereignty plays out in the practical politics of
shaping specific laws and concrete institutions in a context where
the key participants accept that the views and values of ordinary
citizens, business elites, and others matter.
2004] 1523
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
